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Abstract 
 
    The development of pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) has allowed 
accurate sex selection to be possible both for medical and non-medical reasons. 
PGD is performed in conjunction with in vitro fertilisation (IVF). Currently, in the UK 
sex selection is only legal for medical reasons. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
analyse the legal and ethical arguments in permitting sex selection for family 
balancing to become legal.  
    Through extensive literature research and analysis this dissertation aims to show 
that allowing sex selection for family balancing will not have a detrimental effect upon 
society or the future sex selected child. Research has revealed that sex selection for 
family balancing will not distort the sex ratio of the UK, it will not be discriminatory 
against one particular sex nor will it be the beginning of the slippery slope towards 
designer babies. Sex selection for family balancing will not be a drain upon the NHS 
resources as it would have to be funded privately and neither will it disregard the 
status of the embryo. 
    The conclusion drawn from this research is that the current regulation on sex 
selection in the UK is inadequate. Many UK parents want access to PGD and 
possibly other sex selective technology, such as sperm sorting, as they want to be 
able to select the sex of their baby for family balancing reasons. The main reasoning 
behind this is that these parents want the opportunity to experience the rearing of 
children of both sexes. As long as there are strict rules and regulations in place and 
the welfare of the future child and any existing children are considered, it is 
recommended that the law on sex selection should change to allow parents to select 
the sex of their baby but only for family balancing reasons. 
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Introduction 
     
    For centuries, couples have tried to determine the sex of their children through a 
number of dubious tricks for example in Sweden men hung their pants on the left 
bedpost if they wanted to father a girl and on the right if they wanted to father a boy.1 
Now in the twenty-first century, with a better understanding of reproduction, it is no 
longer necessary for parents to resort to these dubious tricks which do not work.  
    The practice of sex selection in the twenty-first century finds its roots in medical 
science. There are a variety of sex selection techniques, including, pre-natal 
diagnosis and abortion, sperm sorting and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). 
“Each type of technology carries with it a different level of intrusion, expanse, health 
risk, and most importantly, a different rate of accuracy in selecting each gender.”2 In 
the early days of sex selection there were two options available: amniocentesis and 
chorionic villus sampling (CVS).3 Both of these techniques are post-implantation sex 
selection methods as the embryo is already implanted into the mother. Even though 
these tests are used to determine whether the potential foetus will have any serious 
medical conditions once it is born, these tests can also discover what sex the foetus 
is. If these tests reveal that the foetus is of the opposite sex to which the parent’s 
desire, then the mother could try and obtain an abortion. During amniocentesis, a 
small sample of amniotic fluid, which surrounds the foetus in the mother’s womb, is 
removed for testing in a laboratory in order to obtain information about the baby.4 
This includes the sex of the foetus.  Amniocentesis is generally considered safe and 
effective but it does involve approximately .5 per cent chance of the pregnancy 
resulting in miscarriage.5 “In CVS the doctor inserts a suction tube transcervically or 
transabdominally during the first trimester of pregnancy and aspirates sloughed-off 
                                                          
1E. Dahl, M. Beutel, B. Brosig, S. Grüssner, Y. Stöbel-Richter, H.-R. Tinneberg, Elmar Brähler, Social 
sex selection and the balan ce of the sexes: Empirical evidence from Germany, the UK, and the US, 
2006, Journal of assisted reproduction and genetics, Vol.23, Issue.7-8, page 311. 
2
 Danis, J, ‘Sexism and the “Superflous Female”: Arguments for Regulating Pre-Implantation Sex 
Selection’,1995, 18 Harv. Women's L.J. 219, page 225. 
3
 Bumgarner, A, ‘A Right to Choose?: Sex Selection in the International Context’, 2007, Duke Journal 
of Gender Law & Policy, Vol.14, No.2, page1292.  
4
< www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Amniocentesis/Pages/How-is-it-performed.aspx>accessed 8th July 2013. 
Also see, Jones, O, ‘Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s 
Gender’, 1992, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol.6, page 7. 
5
 Park, S, ‘Should Prospective Parents have the Right to Design their Ideal Child’, 2000, Children’s 
Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 20, No.1, page 37. 
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cells.”6 The cells’ DNA are then analyzed for indication of gender.7  CVS is more 
advantageous than amniocenteses for prospective parents because it provides them 
with critical information, including the sex of the foetus as early as ten to twelve 
weeks of pregnancy whereas with amniocentesis it is not recommended to be 
carried out prior to 15 weeks as there is the potential danger of miscarriage or birth 
defects.8  The disadvantage of CVS is that approximately one to three pregnancies 
in one hundred ends in miscarriage.9 While both of these methods can determine the 
sex of the foetus, they are extremely intrusive. However, there is a third post-
implantation sex selection technique which is less invasive than amniocentesis and 
CVS. This is ultrasound. “The expanded use of ultrasound technology in the late 
1970s gave would-be parents a faster, less invasive means of determining the sex of 
the foetus. By using ultrasound imaging technology, health care providers were able 
to discern the sex of the foetus in the early months of pregnancy. The relatively low 
cost, simplicity and accessibility of ultrasounds have made it an integral part of most 
non-medical sex selection decisions.”10  
    Unlike, prenatal diagnosis and abortion, sperm sorting is a method which is used 
prior to conception. Sperm sorting is the least technically complex method of directed 
procreation.11 This technology has the advantage of working prior to conception and 
thus eliminating the concerns regarding the moral status and ethical dispositions of 
the human embryo.12  “Exploiting the fact that X-bearing sperm have more DNA than 
Y-bearing sperm, MicroSort uses flow cytometric separation technology to separate 
out the sperm, which is then used for intrauterine insemination or IVF.”13 It has been 
revealed that the MicroSort technique is more effective in selecting girls at a success 
rate of 91%, than for boys, with a success rate of only 76%.14 Artificial insemination 
is less burdensome and less costly than IVF because no eggs need to be harvested 
                                                          
6
 Jones, O, ‘Sex Selection: Regulating Technology Enabling the Predetermination of a Child’s 
Gender’, 1992, Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, Vol.6, page 7.  
7
 ibid.  
8
 See footnote 5. Also, see <www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Amniocentesis/Pages/When-should-it-be-
done.aspx>accessed 8th July 2013. 
9
 See footnote 5.  
10
 See footnote 3. 
11
 Davis, D, ‘The Parental Investment Factor and the Child’s Right to an Open Future’, 2009, The 
Hastings Center Report, Vol.39, No.2, page 25. 
12
 ibid. 
13
 ibid. 
14
 Long, A, ‘Why Criminalizing Sex Selection Techniques is Unjust: An Argument Challenging 
Conventional Wisdom’, 2006, Health.L.J, Vol.14, page 72. 
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and fertilization and implantation occur naturally inside the woman’s body.15 
Additionally, because the sorted sperm can be stored, shipped and used for 
insemination anywhere in the world, residents of rural and less developed areas 
could utilize the situation. 16 
    In the twenty-first century the most accurate method of sex selection is PGD. PGD 
is a procedure which is performed upon embryos created through in vitro fertilisation 
(IVF). There are three main categories of disease which PGD is used for; sex linked 
disorders such as Tay Sachs17 or Duchenne muscle dystrophy18; single gene 
defects, for instance cystic fibrosis19; and chromosomal disorders such as 
translocations, inversions and chromosome deletions.20 Parents who carry these 
genes and are likely to pass them on to their children can use PGD in conjunction 
with IVF in order to have a child free from the disease as only unaffected embryos 
will be implanted into the mother. 
    PGD was first developed in 1989 and was used in order to avoid creating a child 
with a genetics based disorder.21 However, in 1992 PGD was used in conjunction 
with IVF in order to create Chloe O’Brien, a child free of the cystic fibrosis gene. Her 
parents, Michelle and Paul were both asymptomatic carriers of the cystic fibrosis 
gene, which meant a 1:4 chance that any child conceived “naturally” would be 
affected by the disease (and a 1:2 chance that the child would, like its parents, be an 
asymptomatic carrier); in fact they had already had a son affected with the disease.22 
This case is crucial because it was the start of a new reproductive era where children 
                                                          
15
 See footnote 3, page 1293. 
16
 ibid. 
17
 Tay Sachs disease is a rare and usually fatal genetic disorder that causes progressive damage to 
the nervous system. See the website <www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Tay-Sachs-
disease/Pages/Introduction.aspx> accessed 15th June 2013. 
18
 Muscle dystrophy (MD) is a genetic (inherited) condition that gradually causes the muscles to 
weaken. This leads to an increasing level of disability. Duchenne MD is the most common form of 
MD. It usually affects boys and is diagnosed at around three years. See the website 
<www.nhs.uk/Conditions/Muscular-dystrophy/Pages/Introduction.aspx> accessed 15th June 2013. 
19
 Cystic fibrosis is a common inherited disease. Cystic fibrosis affects the internal organs especially 
the lungs and digestive system. It causes them to become clogged with thick sticky mucus. See the 
website <www.nhs.uk/Conditions/cystic-fibrosis/Pages/Introduction.aspx> accessed 15th June 2013.  
20
 Scott, R, ‘Choosing Between Possible Lives: Legal and Ethical Issues in Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis’, 2006, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol.26, No.1,  page 157. 
21
 Vacco, L, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to Customizing 
Children. Can the Technology be Regulated Based Upon the Parents’ Intent?’ 2004-2005, Saint Louis 
University Law Journal, Vol. 49, Issue 4, page 1184. 
22
 Gavaghan, C, ‘Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Law and Ethics of Selecting the Next 
Generation’, 2007, Routledge-Cavendish, page 6. 
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could be born without suffering from deadly diseases and without being carriers of 
these diseases and thus not passing them onto their children. 
    During PGD the unfertilised eggs are removed from the mother which are then 
fertilised by the father’s sperm in a test tube. When the fertilised eggs have divided 
into eight identical cells, they are analysed for undesired genetic defects. It is at this 
point where testing for sex is performed.23 PGD prevents parents from being faced 
with the difficult decision of whether to terminate a pregnancy because the foetus will 
suffer from a potential life threatening disease. A termination can be physically and 
emotionally stressful and PGD prevents parents from having to go through this. 
People seeking PGD have different requirements than those seeking IVF as they are 
not necessarily infertile they just wish for their child to be born without a severe 
illness or disability. Prior to receiving treatment for PGD, parents should understand 
that the potential child will only be free of conditions for which the testing was done. 
PGD does not guarantee that the potential child will be free from all genetic or 
congenital disorders.24 
    It is argued that PGD does not give parents the power to select every 
characteristic of their children.  “Not all diseases or non-health related traits (such as 
intelligence or strength) have a clearly diagnosable genetic component; many result 
from the interaction of multiple genetic or environmental factors and cannot be 
detected by genetic testing.”25 PGD does not create new genetic characteristics in 
those embryos that neither parent possesses, nor does it allow parents to pick and 
choose among characteristics present in different embryos.26  PGD does not involve 
genetic engineering. At the moment PGD can give parents the option not only to 
have a child free of severe disease but also the option to have a child of a particular 
sex in order to balance their family. This dissertation will focus primarily on sex 
selection through PGD as it is the most accurate method of performing sex selection. 
    Sex selection invokes various ethical, religious, social and political issues. While 
there is disagreement among various doctors, ethicists and the general public 
regarding the level of medical necessity that should justify sex selection, most would 
                                                          
23
 See footnote 5, page 38.   
24
 See footnote 21, page 1185. 
25
 Baruch, S, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental Preferences: Beyond Deadly Disease’, 
2008, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 245 page 250. 
26
 ibid.  
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agree that sex selection for medical reasons is ethically and morally acceptable.27  
However, there is wide and varied disagreement regarding sex selection for non-
medical reasons. Firstly, sex selection brings into question the status of the embryo 
and when does life begin. For those who believe that life begins at conception such 
as the Catholic Church, sex selection whether for medical or non-medical reasons 
would be wrong as all life is sacred and the taking of any life is morally and ethically 
wrong. For those who believe that life begins at some later point may allow that sex 
selection would be ethically acceptable but within a time limit. Secondly, there are 
concerns that sex selection will impact upon the sex ratio dramatically which may 
have various consequences for the UK. There is a fear that male children would be 
selected more often than female children which may lead to more violence, more 
men may remain single, less reproduction or men may have the higher paid jobs. 
However, it will be argued that unlimited sex selection should not become legal, only 
sex selection for family balancing where parents could only select the sex of a future 
child which is opposite to the sex of existing children. Thirdly, sex selection raises 
concerns that parents will treat children as commodities in order to satisfy their own 
desires. Parents’ who use sex selective technology may expect a child of a certain 
sex to behave in a certain way and to meet their gendered expectations and failure 
to do so may have a detrimental effect upon the parent-child relationship. It will be 
argued in this dissertation that parents’ want to select the sex of their children for 
family balancing reasons for the varied rearing experiences. Fourthly, if sex selection 
for family balancing did become legal within the UK it would have to be decided how 
it should be funded. It will be argued that sex selection for family balancing should 
not be funded by the NHS as it is not a medical condition that needs treating. Rather 
it is a desire that parents’ have which they want fulfilled and so should be funded by 
them privately.  
    “Sex selection has long been desired by many different cultures and societies for 
a variety of reasons, and a number of clinics advertise and perform PGD for non 
medical reasons, although not in the UK.”28 PGD for non medical reasons appeals 
especially to two types of groups: those who want a first born of a particular gender 
                                                          
27
 See footnote 3, page 1290. 
28Fahrenkrog, A, ‘Comparison of International Regulation of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and a 
Regulatory Suggestion for the United States’, 2006, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 
Vol. 15, Issue 2, page 759. 
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and those who already have children and want a more “balanced family” of males 
and females.29 
    This dissertation will critically analyse the issue of whether UK parents should be 
legally allowed to select the sex of their children for family balancing. It will be argued 
in this dissertation that this should be changed to allow parents the freedom to select 
the sex of their children for family balancing reasons as most couples wanting 
access to sex selective technology do so because of the different rearing 
experiences. It is now recognised by psychologists that there does exist biological 
differences between male and female children and this is what parents’ desire and 
not because they have discriminatory or stereotypical attitudes. Chapter one will 
begin by explaining the issues of family balancing and reproductive autonomy. It will 
be argued that parents should be given the reproductive freedom to select the sex of 
their children for family balancing reasons as long as strict conditions are set in 
place. Reproductive freedom should not be limited unless there is a danger to 
citizens or society and it is up to those who wish to restrict a person’s reproductive 
freedom to show why. It will be argued in this chapter that sex selection for family 
balancing should not be a danger to either citizens or society. Firstly, selection for 
family balancing will not cause the sex ratio to rise and even if there was a fear of 
there being a dramatic increase in the sex ratio of the UK then certain conditions 
could be set in place to ensure the sex ratio remains constant. Secondly, it is 
suggested that sex selection for family balancing would not enhance or support sex 
discrimination. It will be shown in this dissertation that most parents want access to 
sex selection technology because they have children all of one sex and would like a 
child of the opposite sex in order to experience the different rearing experiences. 
Many may think that this will enhance gender stereotypical views but this is not the 
case as it is now recognised that there are biological differences between male and 
female children. Further, there would the welfare of the child condition in place which 
would ensure that if there was a risk to the future child or to any existing children 
then parents would be denied treatment. Thirdly, it will be shown using Kant’s and 
Parfit’s theories that sex selection for family balancing is not treating children as 
commodities and that parents could still love their children unconditionally. Parents’ 
are allowed to select against unhealthy embryos or pose a threat by drinking and 
                                                          
29
 ibid 760. 
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taking drugs through pregnancy which does not imply unconditional acceptance, so 
why should parents be prevented from selecting the sex of their children for family 
balancing? Fourthly, sex selection for family balancing would not be the beginning of 
the slippery slope towards designer babies as selection would be based upon sex 
alone and then parents would only be allowed to select the sex of the child which is 
opposite to the sex of existing children. At the moment selection for any other trait is 
not possible and if it did become a reality in the future then it would be appropriately 
regulated then. Sex selection for family balancing should not be prevented from 
becoming legal because there is a fear of designer babies in the future.  
    Chapter two will discuss and analyse the socio-economic factors of allowing sex 
selection for family balancing.  Parents who wish to select the sex of their children for 
family balancing reasons and can afford to, can travel abroad to a country where sex 
selection for family balancing is legal. This could imply that the current regulation of 
sex selection in the UK is not effective but penalising couples would be difficult to 
implement as it would be hard to prove that they travelled abroad for sex selective 
treatment. However, if sex selection for family balancing did become legal within the 
UK, then how should it be funded? It is argued that sex selection for family balancing 
should be funded privately as NHS resources should not be directed away from 
those with medical conditions.  
    Chapter three will finish with a discussion on the legal issues involved in sex 
selection for family balancing. Reproductive treatment is regulated by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology (HFE) Act and states that sex selection for all non-
medical reasons is illegal (section 3 of Schedule 2 of the 2008 Act). The HFE Act 
created the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority which ensures that all 
clinics abide by the HFE Act and do not carry out any activities without a license. 
Over the years the HFEA has carried out various consultations regarding sex 
selection but they have all concluded that sex selection for non-medical reasons 
should remain illegal. While it is important to consult with the public regarding such 
controversial issues as sex selection, it must be remembered that there should be a 
presumption in favour of reproductive liberty and that it is for those who oppose such 
practices to show why it should be illegal.  
    Article 8(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights protects the right to a 
private and family life and raises a number of complex issues of autonomy and rights 
within the debate of sex selection. Couples’ reproductive choices clearly comes 
11 
 
within the remit of article 8 but does that include allowing parents’ the freedom to 
choose the sex of their children for family balancing reasons? It could be argued that 
it does as sex selection for family balancing is concerned with intimate family life 
where couples should be free to make decisions without interference. However, 
article 8(1) must be read in conjunction with article 8(2) which legally allows that 
state to interfere in a person’s private life in certain circumstances. The interference 
by the state must be for the protection of society or citizens and must be necessary 
and proportionate as well as balancing all the competing interests involved. It will be 
argued that the best response the state could take would be to allow parents’ their 
reproductive freedom in choosing the sex of their children for family balancing 
reasons, as it is a proportionate response and it does balance all the competing 
interests. Further, at the moment there is no overriding objection why sex selection 
for family balancing would be detrimental to either UK citizens or to society as a 
whole. 
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Chapter One 
The Potential Consequences of Allowing Sex Selection for Family Balancing 
the UK 
   
    With the advancement of PGD it is now possible for parents to select the sex of 
their children with amazing accuracy for both medical and non-medical reasons. The 
foremost reason that parents want to select the sex of their children for non-medical 
reasons is for family balancing. The aim of this chapter is to explain and analyse 
whether parents should have the freedom to select the sex of their baby for family 
balancing reasons and what the potential consequences will be for UK society as a 
whole.  
 
Family Balancing and Reproductive Liberty 
    One of the most persuasive arguments for allowing sex selection for non-medical 
reasons is that of family balancing.  Particularly, in Western Societies parents wish to 
have a well balanced family in terms of sex. Ideally, a balanced family implies an 
equal number of boys and girls. Family balancing is when parents have children 
predominantly of one sex and would like to have a child of the opposite sex to 
complement their family, for example, when a couple already have three girls and 
would like to use PGD in order to have a boy.30  A case which clearly describes 
family balancing and accurately represents the UK’s position is the Masterton case. 
The Mastertons’ wanted to use sex selection technology to have a daughter but were 
refused by the HFEA.31  This decision by the HFEA raises a number of arguments 
regarding parents’ reproductive autonomy rights and the selection of children based 
upon sex. 
    On the one hand there are those who believe that parents should have unlimited 
reproductive freedom. This is where people should have the freedom to make any 
decision concerning their reproduction without state interference. This would not only 
                                                          
30
 Wilkinson, S, ‘Sexism, Sex Selection and “Family Balancing”’, 2008, Medical Law Review, Vol.16, 
Issue.3, page 371. 
31
 Their 3 year old daughter Nicole suffered severe burns and died after a gas balloon fell onto a 
bonfire in their garden. The Mastertons’ were left with four surviving sons. Following their daughter’s 
death the Mastertons were keen to have another daughter and applied to the HFEA to allow then to 
use sex selection to ensure that they had a daughter. The HFEA refused and the Mastertons’ 
travelled to Rome to receive sex selective treatment. The treatment was unsuccessful as it only 
resulted in a male embryo which they decided to donate to an infertile couple. 
13 
 
include the right to select the sex of children for family balancing but also the right to 
select any characteristic of children if it were possible. On the other hand there are 
those that believe that reproductive freedom should be totally restricted. This is 
where people should have no freedom over their reproductive choices. Then there 
are those in between who believe that parents should have some control over their 
reproductive choices but that it should not be unlimited. This is the current position 
the UK has taken by making sex selection only legal for medical reasons. This right 
or entitlement to reproductive liberty is found in all the principle conventions or 
declarations of human rights. “Sometimes it is expressed as the right to marry and 
found a family, sometimes as the right to privacy and the right to respect for family 
life.”32 In the UK it is mainly expressed through Article 8 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights as the right to privacy and family life. The legal aspect of Article 8 
will be discussed in more detail in chapter three, at page 75. 
    It could be argued that allowing parents’ reproductive liberty to choose the sex of 
their children for family balancing reasons may result in having a profound effect 
upon the definition of what a family should or should not consist of.  Wilkinson 
argues that:  
 
    “The worry is that such language is pejorative and implies that families not      
    containing boys and girls in roughly equal numbers are somehow defective. And  
    while many parents (and prospective parents) do desire sex ‘balance it is difficult  
    to see how one could justify any suggestion that families with all girls or all boys  
    are objectively inferior”.33  
 
This is crucial because it produces a particularly narrow definition of what and what 
not a family should consist of. Will families which do not contain children of both 
genders be somehow defective?  However, it could be argued that allowing unlimited 
access to sex selection technology might have a profound effect upon the sex ratio 
of the UK and enhance sex discriminatory attitudes instead of combating them (see 
the following two sections for a discussion on the sex ratio and sex discrimination). 
                                                          
32
 Harris, J, ‘Sex Selection and Regulated Hatred’, 2005, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 31, No. 5, 
page 292. Also, see Alghrani, A, and Harris, J, ‘Reproductive Liberty: Should the Foundation of 
Families be Regulated?’,2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol.18, No.2, page 191. 
33
 See footnote 30, page 372. 
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    If sex selection for family balancing were to become legal within the UK then the 
definition should be interpreted strictly. In the 2002-2003 consultation document the 
HFEA suggested two ways in which the definition of family balancing could be 
narrowed. The first suggestion was to make having no existing children of the 
desired sex a condition; so parents’ could only select to have a girl if they had three 
boys and no girls. The second suggestion was to have a requirement where there 
was a sex differential of two or more; so selecting a girl would be allowed if the family 
had four boys and one girl but not if the family had four boys and three girls.34 I 
suggest that if sex selection for family balancing were to become legal within the UK 
then it is should only be allowed in cases where couples have no existing children of 
the desired sex because it reduces the risk that parents have sexist attitudes 
towards their children. This then leaves the question of how many existing children of 
one sex should a couple have before they can present themselves at a clinic for 
family balancing. It is suggested that PGD for family balancing should not be used 
for the first child because in order for a family to be unbalanced there would have to 
exist at least two children of the same sex for there to be an imbalance. By just 
having one chid there is no bias. However, it could be argued that if parents wish a 
perfect family balance of two children consisting of one boy and one girl then they 
should be given the reproductive liberty to do so. Clearly, this debate raises complex 
issues of how much reproductive autonomy parents’ should be given in selecting the 
sex of their children. 
    An important aspect of reproductive liberty is that it should not be limited without 
very good reason.  As Alghrani and Harris state: 
 
    “The presumption is that citizens should be free to make their own choices in the  
     light of their own values, whether or not these choices and values are acceptable  
     to the majority. Only serious danger, either to other citizens or to society, is  
     sufficient to rebut this presumption. And the seriousness has of course at least  
     two axes, one regarding the magnitude of danger, the other concerning             
     probability or proximity – how real and present it is. If anything less than this high  
                                                          
34
 HFEA as quoted in Wilkinson, S, ‘Sexism, Sex Selection and “Family Balancing”’, 2008, Medical 
Law Review, Vol.16, Issue.3, page 371. 
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     standard is accepted liberty is dead.”35   
 
This is supported by John Stuart Mill and his argument of the ‘tyranny of the 
majority’. In order to avoid the tyranny of the majority it must be shown that the 
exercise of freedom infringes either the liberty of others or poses a danger of 
significant harm to individuals or society.36 It is not enough that people simply do not 
agree with how a person chooses to exercise their reproductive freedom or that they 
are made uncomfortable by it. This argument indicates that parents should 
automatically be given the freedom to choose to have two children consisting of one 
boy and one girl if that is what they desire and it is for those who oppose it to show 
why this freedom should be limited. However, I disagree with this and think that 
parents should only be able to select the sex of their children after they have three 
children consisting all of the same sex as to use sex selection after one child 
reinforces the idea that there exists a specific definition of a family and this is not the 
case within the UK. Furthermore, it is suggested that at two an imbalance is 
beginning to form which may be rectified by the third child. At three it can be said 
that parents whose children are all of the same sex have been cheated by nature 
and are playing with a loaded dice.37 This idea may be reinforced by a form of 
gambler’s fallacy: the conviction that the probability of having a boy after three girls is 
higher than the probability of having a girl as a first child.38  This could indicate that 
couples who want children of both sexes should just keep trying because eventually 
they will have a baby of the opposite sex to which they have. But at what point does 
a couple say that enough is enough and to stop trying as it is not just as simple as 
having one child after another. Other considerations should be taken into account 
such as money, the physical and mental health of the woman, and the other existing 
children of the family who will be affected by each pregnancy etc. 
    The UK has a society and culture which contains varying types of family which 
may present two difficulties in the debate concerning sex selection for family 
                                                          
35Alghrani, A, and Harris, J, ‘Reproductive Liberty: Should the Foundation of Families be 
Regulated?’,2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol.18, No.2, page 195.  Also, see Harris, J, ‘Sex 
Selection and Regulated Hatred’, 2005, Journal of Medical Ethics, Vol. 31, No. 5, page 293. 
36
 Alghrani, A, and Harris, J, ‘Reproductive Liberty: Should the Foundation of Families be 
Regulated?’,2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol.18, No.2, page 195.  
37
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balancing. The first issue which may arise is whether the sex of children from 
previous relationships should be taken into account when considering whether a 
couple are eligible for sex selection for family balancing. A suggested solution to this 
problem is to refer to the guidelines for couples who apply for IVF. Some Primary 
Health Care Trusts (PCTs) make the requirement that there “should be no living 
children from the current relationship or from previous relationships or no children 
under a specified age living with the couple”.39 The regulations regarding access to 
IVF treatment is demonstrated by an IVF case which hit the media headlines in 
2011.40  Mrs Ghevaert, a solicitor acting on behalf of the couple seeking the IVF 
treatment stated that: 
 
    “it is unfair to deny a childless woman access to IVF funding on the NHS if her  
     partner has a child from a previous relationship. This actively discriminates  
     against women and denies them the opportunity to bear their own children and  
     become mothers.41   
 
This could indicate that children from previous relationships should not be taken into 
account as each parent should have the experience of rearing children of both sexes 
if they so wish. Also, if couples are privately funding their sex selection treatment, 
then children from previous relationships should not be taken into account. The 
Marshalls’ were told that they could have IVF if they funded it themselves. The 
second issue is why should parents be able to select the sex of their children for 
family balancing reasons but not for other non-medical reasons? For example, why 
should parents not be able to use PGD in order to select their children to be all of the 
same sex, if that is what they desire? As will be discussed in the next section, most 
couples who want to use sex selection methods do so because they want to have 
children of both sexes and allowing sex selection for family balancing will not have 
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such a dramatic impact on the sex ratio as might other non-medical sex selection 
reasons.  
 
Sex Ratio 
    By allowing parents to select the sex of their children, there is the fear that it will 
have a dramatic effect upon the sex ratio of the UK. However, as this section aims to 
show allowing sex selection only for family balancing reasons will not alter the sex 
ratio of the UK. The sex ratio is defined as the number of male live births for every 
100 female live births. Exact sex ratio figures are hard to obtain because of the 
inadequacy of vital statistics of registration across many populations.42 The sex ratio 
tends to be consistent with 105-107 male births for every 100 female births. 
However, this may change if sex selection technology were allowed for non-medical 
reasons. This slight excess of male births than female births was first documented in 
1710 by John Graunt and colleagues for the population of London.43 Some 
alterations in the sex ratio do occur naturally; for example it has been documented 
that a small excess of male births has been reported to occur during and after war.44  
In Europe and the U.S there have been findings of a small but significant increase in 
male births during and after the First and Second World War, and in the U.S or the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Balkan Wars and the Iran-Iraq War did not produce 
similar findings.45 There have been many proposed biological reasons why there 
could be an increase in the sex ratio during and after war which include, stress to 
adult males affecting the viability of XY – bearing sperm vs. XX-bearing sperm or 
higher frequency of intercourse, leading to conception earlier in the menstrual 
cycle.46These increases in males during and after war do not last for long but would 
sex selection for non-medical reasons has a more lasting effect upon the sex ratio. 
    It is suggested that sex selection for family balancing is less likely than other forms 
to cause population sex imbalance.47 There is the argument that if you were 
concerned about the sex ratio rising than you would only allow sex selection for 
                                                          
42
 Hesketh T, Xing ZW, ‘Abnormal Sex Ratios in Human Populations: Causes and Consequences’, 
2006, PNAS, Vol.104, No.36, page 13271. 
43
 ibid.  
44
 ibid.  
45
 ibid.  
46
 ibid. 
47
 See footnote 30, page 374. 
18 
 
family balancing which should have no effect upon the sex ratio.48 If this argument 
were to succeed then three conditions would have to be established. Firstly, that 
population sex differential is a bad thing.49 Secondly, that unfettered sex selection 
would allow the sex ratios to rise dramatically and thirdly, that family balancing alone 
would not cause population sex differentials to rise.50   
   In regard to the first condition, would population sex differentials be a bad thing 
within the UK? Literature has tended to focus on the consequences of having a more 
male dominated society, rather than a more female dominated society because it is 
presumed that given the opportunity, parents would opt to select male children. This 
is supported by the Mirror’s health expert Miriam Stoppard who has warned that:  
 
    “given that most parents opt for boys, we would end up with a society heavily  
     biased towards men and all that comes with that—more crime, more hooligans,  
     more drunken aggression, more wars. There would be more room for tyrants and  
     despots, religious fundamentalists and incitors of hatred. The prospect is so blood  
     chilling; I hope it remains in the realm of science fiction”.51  However, it must be  
     remembered that many consequences such as increased levels of violence, are  
     likely to be multifactorial in causation and therefore impossible to attribute simply  
     to gender imbalance.52 
 
    The potential consequence for women of having a more male dominated society is 
that they may only be valued for their “reproductive capacities” which may lead to 
women being forced into more traditional roles which are centred around the home 
and the family.53 This argument is supported by Rowland who maintains that “women 
will be valued for their sexual and breeding purposes rather than for their intrinsic 
worth as a person”.54 On the other hand, if males were selected more often it may 
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lead to there being fewer female births in one generation which would mean that 
there would be fewer overall births when these girls reach reproductive age.55 The 
potential consequence for men is that they will become rivals for the attentions of the 
relatively scarce available women. This was prophesied by the American sociologist, 
Amitai Etzioni, in 1968 when he stated that:  
 
    “if a safe and effective preconception method were to become available, sex  
     selection will cause a severe imbalance of the sexes in the United States of  
     America. The practice of social sex selection, he predicted, will condemn millions  
     of men to a life of misery in which they will not find mates and will have to avail  
     themselves of prostitution, homosexuality, or be condemned to enforced  
     bachelorhood”.56 
 
As there will be fewer women available, men will have a lower chance of ever finding 
true love and settling down to marriage and children. This is what is currently 
happening in India, where there is a distorted sex ratio in favour of men and the 
consequences of this are now being realised because prenatal sex determination 
only began to be available in about 1985 and the resulting large cohorts of ‘‘surplus’’ 
young men are only now reaching reproductive age.57 When there is a shortage of 
women in the marriage market, it leaves women with the potential option of being 
able to “marry up” and leaving the least desirable men with no marriage prospects 
and a life of bachelorhood. For example, 94% of unmarried people aged between 
28-49 are male and 97% of them have not complete high school.58 Women may 
benefit from a society with more men because as Mary Anne Warren' notes: 
 
    “there is no empirical data to support the belief that a high ratio society would be   
     detrimental to women. She suggests that a high sex ratio might actually create        
     social conditions in which men would value women more highly within the social    
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     spheres that women would occupy”.59 
 
 However, how many women would be happy in a world where men would only value 
them for their reproductive capacities. 
    A distorted sex ratio would have a bad effect upon society.  Assuming that males 
would be selected it may enhance sex discrimination and gender stereotyping as 
women would not have the political power or economic resources to change their 
status and there may even be an increase in oppression and violence against 
women because men may feel the need to possess a limited resource and to ensure 
fidelity.60 There is a chance that in the UK women will outnumber men, but there is 
no eviden ce of this. However, it could be suggested that a predominantly female 
human world would be preferable as men are responsible for more than their fair 
share of crime and violence.  
    With regard to the second condition, would unfettered sex selection cause the sex 
ratio to rise dramatically? A UK survey conducted at the Centre for Family Research 
of the University of Cambridge found that of 2359 pregnant women surveyed, 6% 
preferred a boy, 6% preferred a girl, 12% quite liked a boy, 19% quite liked a girl, 
and 58% said they had no preference for a child of a particular sex.61 These results 
imply that most parents do not have a preference over the sex of their children. 
However, in another UK survey a slightly higher number of respondents indicated 
that they would prefer a boy (16%) rather than a girl to be their first-born child, a 
large majority (73%) expressed no preference and 10% preferred a first-born girl.62 
An increase in the percentage of male firstborns may leave more females with 
psychological and economic damage commensurate with "second child syndrome" 
and the disempowerment this yields.63 It could be argued that males may know that 
because they have been selected more often than girls that they are the more 
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desired gender by their parents and society and thus increasing their feelings of self-
worth and self-importance and diminishing the self-esteem of their younger sisters 
and other girls.64 Data, such as these surveys, seem to imply that most parents have 
no preference to the sex of their first child but in order to prevent these potential 
consequences of having more first born sons, only sex selection for family balancing 
should be allowed. 
   In regard to the third and final condition, it is suggested that family balancing alone 
would not cause population sex differentials to rise. Allowing sex selection for family 
balancing implies that the intended outcome is to make a family well balanced not 
the country as a whole. This is because at least the first two or three children of the 
family will be determined by nature and not by science and it will only be when there 
is imbalance, for example, a family already has three boys and would like a girl, 
would family balancing come into play. There is a small risk that certain areas of the 
country could result in one sex being noticeably outnumbered. However, if there 
were concerns about the alteration of the sex ratio of the UK then certain conditions 
could be put in place to ensure the sex ratio stayed constant. These may include 
setting up waiting lists for couples who wanted a child of the more frequently chosen 
sex, always pairing couples who wanted a boy with a couple who wanted a girl, 
taxing parents of the preponderant sex more heavily or couples could even be 
encouraged or made to donate their viable spare embryos, thus almost completely 
eliminating any unbalancing effects.65 Not all these suggestions would be viable 
options within the UK in order to maintain a population balance. Firstly, waiting lists 
could be set up but this may lead to couples having to wait years before they could 
be offered sex selection and as the HFEA stated in its post-consultation paper that: 
 
    “… recent studies in the UK showed no significant overall preference for one sex  
     over the other although a disproportionately high percentage of those actively  
     seeking sex selection were from ethnic populations originating from outside  
     Europe. Amongst these there was a marked preference for male children    
     although this was from families who already had more than one female child and    
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     were nearing the end of their reproductive lives”.66 
 
 Also, it is argued that it could result in there being bigger gaps between children 
than parents would like which may end in siblings not having a strong bond. 
Secondly, while the pairing system does seem to be the best way to ensure that the 
sex ratio is maintained, it is suggested that it would have to be tightly regulated as 
there would be nothing to prevent clinics from swopping allowances, for example, if 
one clinic was experiencing a high demand for girls and another was experiencing a 
high demand for boys than they may swop their allowances and while this would not 
result in a differing of the sex ratio of the country overall it would affect the sex ratio 
in the particular areas. Thirdly, it could be argued that taxing parents of the 
preponderant sex more heavily would not work, as if parents desperately wanted a 
child of a certain sex and are willing to pay the fee of PGD and sex selection, then 
they would be willing to pay a higher tax. This would not then maintain the sex ratio. 
Fourthly, while couples could be encouraged to donate spare embryos to infertile 
couples, it would be difficult to force them to do so and thus not maintaining the sex 
ratio. 
    It is argued that sex selection for family balancing would not cause the sex ratio of 
the UK to rise dramatically as most couples who want to use sex selection 
technology do so because of family balancing reasons. There is a small chance that 
in countries where there is a strong socio-cultural preference for one gender then 
widespread family-balancing may lead to skewed population sex ratios.67 The UK is 
a multi-cultural society which tends to favour men and women equally so it is unlikely 
that there will be a dramatic impact on the sex ratio if there was unlimited sex 
selection. Further, for a dramatic distortion of the sex ratio to occur then two 
conditions must be met. Firstly, there must be a marked preference for children of a 
certain sex and secondly, there must be a considerable demand for a reproductive 
service for social sex selection.68 While historically most cultures have preferred to 
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have male children, this is no longer the case in the UK. It is suggested that parents 
with children of both sexes are much more content with their family composition as 
couples with two boys and couples with two girls are more likely to have a third child 
than couples with one boy and one girl.69 This is supported by data collected from 
the Gender Clinic of New York City which reported that all of 120 American couples 
seeking sex selection did so because of family balancing reasons: they selected girls 
when they had boys at home and boys when they had girls at home.70 While this 
data is based upon American preferences the results can be applied to the UK as 
both the UK and the US share a similar culture. This data shows that couples 
wanting to take advantage of sex selection techniques do so because of family 
balancing reasons. However, while sex selection for family balancing will not alter 
the sex ratio, will it enhance gender stereotyping because parents would expect a 
child of a certain sex to behave in a certain way? 
  
Discrimination 
    There is the belief that non-medical sex selection, even for family balancing, is 
discriminatory.  Tabitha Powledge argues that couples should not be allowed to 
select the sex of their children either through pre – or post – conception technologies 
because to do so is one of the most sexist acts to engage in and it makes the most 
basic judgement about the worth of a human being rest first and foremost on its 
sex.71 However, as this section aims to show, sex selection for family balancing is 
not sexist and there are legitimate reasons why parents should be allowed to select 
the sex of their baby which are not discriminatory and which do not rely solely upon 
sex. 
    There are two types of sex discrimination. The first is sex-supremacism, which is 
the belief that one sex is better than the other. One of the main problems with this 
type of discrimination is that there is a difference between preferring to have a child 
of a particular sex and believing that sex to be superior.72 People may prefer to have 
a child of a certain sex not because they believe that sex to be superior but because 
they feel that they will have more in common with them. For example, a mother and 
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daughter might enjoy going shopping together or the same films. This can be 
contrasted with the disability debate where parents wish to have a child who is also 
deaf in order to share the same experiences.73 Mary Anne Warren has observed that  
 
    “women may have a rational reason for preferring daughters: A son might be able  
     to share most of their particular interests and activities, but he could not share the  
     basic experience of being female in a society which still values males more  
     highly. However much he may sympathise with the plight of women, he will still be  
     a member of the more privileged sex”.74 
 
 While this is a valid argument, is it relevant to the UK? It is assumed that in the UK 
women are treated equally to men. However, it could be argued that this is not 
always the case. This can be demonstrated by the area of employment law, which is 
extensively regulated. For example, “the Sex Discrimination Act applies when a 
woman is discriminated against because of her sex, either directly or indirectly”.75 
The Act also applies to men (section 2) but only one in twenty sex discrimination 
cases are bought by men.76 This is crucial because it implies that if the majority of 
cases are being brought by women then even though the law is in place for women 
to be treated the same as men this is not happening. Women are still struggling for 
equality, even in the West, and women may prefer to have a daughter in order to 
share the experience of this fight. Furthermore, parents may want to have a child of 
the same sex in order to enjoy and share the same experiences. Parents may feel 
strongly about the sort of relationship they would like to have with their child and this 
may only be achieved by having a child of a certain sex.77 This is not because 
parents feel that children of one sex are superior but because sexes do differ and 
may offer different parent-child relationships.78 However, this is not necessarily going 
to happen. A daughter might prefer to play football instead of going shopping. “Unlike 
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the inability of men to become pregnant, there are no genetic barriers to girls fishing 
or boys shopping”.79 Everyone is different and have different tastes and these do not 
necessarily conform to gender or parents expectations which are closely linked to 
stereotyping. 
    The second form of sex discrimination is sex-stereotyping which involves an 
exaggerated opinion of the difference sex makes to a person’s personal 
characteristics and behaviour.80 Parents may want a child of a certain sex in 
anticipation of the social roles the child will perform in the future. For example a man 
may want a son with whom he could play football or rugby with or a woman may 
want a daughter because she would like a daughter to go shopping with. These 
assumptions presume that one sex is more appropriately suited to certain social 
tasks which perpetuate and foster stereotypical social roles.81 However, when 
parents want to select the sex of their children, do they because they want their 
children to have characteristics determined by biology or because of characteristics 
determined by society mainly in the form of gender roles? 
    It is now recognised by psychologists that there are many biologically based 
differences between male and female children including different patterns of 
aggression, learning, and spatial recognition, as well as hormonal differences.82 It 
then may not be sexist then to want a child of a certain sex especially if a couple has 
two or more children of the same sex at home. This is further supported by the Jack-
in-the-box experiment. This experiment documented the responses of young children 
to a startling stimulus (a Jack-in-the-box). It was revealed that the same responses 
were deemed to be ‘fear’ when the child in question was believed to be female, and 
‘anger’ when it was believed to be male.83 While these arguments show that some 
parents may want to select sex based upon biological factors, it is suggested that 
there may be some parents who may want to select the sex of their children based 
upon the anticipated gender roles that they will fill because of their sex. 
    The emphasis placed on ‘family balancing’ arguments in the West suggest that 
what is desired by families is not children with different genitals but children who 
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conforms to the opposite gender roles to children they already have. traditional 
gender roles.84 Gender roles tend to describe the difference between males and 
females in respect of behaviour, attitudes, and dispositional traits which leads to 
gender stereotyping.85 Traditionally, men have been warriors, hunters, breadwinners 
and women have tended to do the cooking, cleaning and raising the children. As a 
result of this differentiation men have been in a better position to acquire and control 
the valuable resources of society and consequently power, privilege, and status has 
always tended to be controlled mainly be men.86 However, the UK is country which in 
theory values men and women equally and a culture is beginning to form where male 
and female roles are interchangeable. Women no longer have to give up their 
careers to raise the children, men can be nurses and midwives while women can be 
plumbers and electricians. Whether the preferred sex is male or female, many argue 
that a preference of a male or female child amounts to an expectation of what a boy 
or a girl will be like. For example, parents might choose a male embryo expecting 
their son to love sports and cars but he may well prefer traditionally "female" 
activities such as playing with dolls.  In some cases children do not always develop 
gender identities to match the gender roles to which they were raised. “Tomboys” 
may conform to the more male gender roles than the female stereotypes would allow 
while “sissies” may conform more to the female gender roles than the male 
stereotypes would allow. Children who display these behaviours are accepted by 
society but many assume that they will “outgrow” these tendencies after puberty.87 It 
could be suggested that sex selection may result in disappointment and strained 
parent-child relationship if the child does not conform to the gender stereotypes.88  
When couples are choosing the sex of their children, they may be making their 
decisions in an environment which may be sexist and which may impact upon the 
children’s future whether the parents like it or not. There is nothing in a girl’s 
biological makeup which makes her more inclined to shop and there is nothing in a 
                                                          
84
 Davis, D, ‘The Parental Investment Factor and the Child’s Right to an Open Future’, 2009, The 
Hastings Center Report, Vol.39, No.2, page 26. Also, see Baruch, S, ‘Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis and Parental Preferences: Beyond Deadly Disease’, 2008, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 245 
page 257. 
85Marini, M, ‘Sex and Gender: What do we Know?’, Sociological Forum, Vol 5, No 1 (Mar 1990), page 
98 
86ibid 96.  
87
 Seavilleklein, V,  and Sherwin, S, ‘The Myth of the Gendered Chromosome: Sex Selection and the 
Social Interest’, 2007, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, Vol. 16, Issue, 1, page 13. 
88
 Baruch, S, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Parental Preferences: Beyond Deadly Disease’, 
2008, 8 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 245, page 257. 
27 
 
boy’s which makes him more likely to fish but it still may be true that parents who 
select a girl are more likely to end up a girl who shops instead of fishes and a boy 
who fishes instead of shops.89 While sex selection for family balancing may enhance 
parents’ desire for a child who behaves in a certain way and with specific 
characteristics, there is evidence that some characteristics are of biological origin 
which supports the argument that parents should be allowed to select the sex of their 
children for family balancing in order to experience the rearing of children of both 
sexes. As Steinbock suggests: “The desire for a son … might be based on the 
recognition that the experience of parenting a boy is different from that of parenting a 
girl”.90 Furthermore it has been suggested that it is socially unhealthy for a child to 
grow up with siblings all of the same sex as society involves people of both genders 
interacting together, both at work and play.91 There is a risk that children who do 
exhibit certain traits associated with the gender the parents’ have chosen may suffer 
from parental disappointment. Parents’ who have gone to great lengths to select the 
sex of their children may have heightened expectations of how girls should behave 
and how boys should behave”.92 However, prior to being allowed access to PGD for 
sex selection for family balancing the welfare of the future child will have to be 
considered (this will be discussed in Chapter 3, page 72). “Also, as Judith Daar has 
argued, in cases where parents deeply prefer a child of one gender, both the child 
and parents may be better off if the parents are able to pursue their wish 93 
    A complex issue which has to be addressed prior to sex selection for family 
balancing becoming legal in the UK is how will parents react to having a sex selected 
child who has gender dysphoria. According, to the NHS choices website the 
definition of gender dysphoria is “a condition in which a person feels that there is a 
mismatch between their biological sex and their gender identity”.94 The biological sex 
is assigned to people at birth by their appearance but gender identity is the gender 
they feel they can identify with or feel themselves to be.95 Gender dysphoria is not a 
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mental illness. When people have gender dysphoria they sometimes feel the need to 
undergo surgery in order for the physical appearance to match their gender identity. 
People with ordinary (i.e. nonpathological) physiologies feel the need to go through 
intensive and invasive medical treatment including lifelong hormone therapy so their 
bodies match their gender identities indicates that sex is not the determining factor 
for gender.96 Allowing sex selection for family balancing may enforce traditional 
gender roles and may not allow children to ascertain which gender identity they most 
identify with. This could possibly lead to parents having expectations of the qualities 
a girl should have and qualities a boy should have and failure to show these 
traditional qualities may lead to disappointment and rejection. 
    It is argued that sex selected children who have gender dysphoria may feel 
pressured into conforming to the gender identity which reflects their biological sex 
because of the time and money that their parents have invested in order to have a 
child of a certain sex. The more time and money that parents invest in order to have 
a child of a certain sex the more entitled they may feel about the qualities the child 
should have, for example, girls should wear dresses and like pink and boys should 
like sports and wear trousers.97 The child may feel guilt ridden into acting according 
to traditional gender roles and may not feel that they can develop their own identity 
and be honest with society and more importantly with themselves about who they 
really are. 
    However, does the small chance that a sex selected child will be born with gender 
dysphoria justify the banning of all non-medical sex selection and limiting parents’ 
reproductive autonomy? It is argued that UK couples who will want access to sex 
selective technology do so for family balancing reasons and to experience the 
rearing of children of both sexes. Prior to a clinic providing reproductive services to a 
couple they must consider the welfare of the potential future child they will create as 
well as the welfare of any existing children.98 If the clinic legitimately believes that 
there is a risk of harm, whether physical or psychological, to the future child or to any 
existing children then they can refuse to provide treatment to the couple. The welfare 
of the child requirement will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three at page 
72.  As with sex discrimination, if there was a risk, no matter how small, that parents 
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would not accept a child with gender dysphoria or if they would not allow that child to 
develop their own identity then they can be refused treatment.  
    It is assumed that by allowing sex selection for non-medical reasons, females will 
be discriminated against. This danger was outlined in the Consultation Document as: 
“to permit sex selection for non-medical reasons is implicitly to condone sex 
discrimination – for example, the kind of discrimination whereby male children are 
favoured heirs when questions of inheritance are considered.”99  It is assumed that 
sex selection will be used more often to select boy rather than girl children but 
without this assumption it is impossible to see how sex selection could be regarded 
as devaluing women.100 On the other hand, in some countries sex selection for 
males may not be sexist. Warren argues that sex selection may not necessarily be 
sexist by women who live in sexist cultures.101 In some cultures, such as India, there 
is a burden on women to produce sons and they may feel that it is in her and her 
child’s best interest if it was male. This would be the case if Savulescu’s theory of 
procreative beneficence was followed. 
    Julian Savulescu principle of procreative beneficence asserts that couples should 
select the child, out of all the possible children they could have, who is expected to 
have the best possible life based on the information available.102 “Procreative 
beneficence is different from eugenics because eugenics is selective breeding to 
produce a better population. A public interest justification for interfering in 
reproduction is different from procreative beneficence which aims at producing the 
best child, of the possible children, a couple could have. That is an essentially a 
private enterprise.”103  Savulescu makes us consider a case where a couple is 
having IVF in order to have a child. It produces two embryos. A battery of tests for 
common diseases is performed. Embryo A has no abnormalities on the tests 
performed. Embryo B has no abnormalities on the tests performed except its genetic 
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profile reveals it has a predisposition to developing asthma.104  According to 
Savulescu the couple should choose the child who will start life with the best 
opportunity of having the best life, even if no one has the right to impose this choice 
on them. For Savulescu having a disabled child would be wrong not because it 
would harm the resulting child but because it is to bring about a worse life than could 
have been the case.105 For Savulescu, the couple should select embryo A to be 
implanted. However, there are many objections to this theory. 
   A common objection to procreative beneficence is that you could be discarding an 
embryo like Mozart or an Olympic swimmer. So in the above example there would be 
no good reason to select embryo A. However, it could also be true that by selecting 
A you could be choosing someone like Mozart but without a predisposition to 
asthma. On the information available A and B are equally likely to be someone like 
Mozart but B is more likely to have asthma.106 While it is understandable that parents 
would want to select against embryos who do have diseases, especially life 
threatening diseases, but what about those embryos who do have a disease albeit 
not a life threatening? Should they be selected against because they have a disease 
and it is automatically assumed that they will not have the best possible life? Are we 
not discriminating against those who do have these diseases? Many people who do 
have a disability have amazing talents also, for example, Stevie Wonder, who has a 
unique career as a singer, composer and instrumentalist but who is also blind.107      
    For the procreative theory to work, it must be possible to rank possible lives as 
better or worse, not only in the sense that a “hearing” embryo will be more likely to 
grow into a child who can hear better than one who is deaf but also in relation to 
concepts involved in the understanding of a life as the best possible life.108 How do 
we determine who will have a better life? Just by considering our own lives or lives of 
friends it is difficult with any precision as to what makes a life go well or what will 
make one have the best possible life. Is a life free of troubled interpersonal 
relationships or free of suffering and disease, or loneliness is a happier life than one 
which does not have any of these experiences in it.109 “It would be extremely difficult 
if not impossible to produce a list of qualities that would reliably lead their owner to 
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live a better life than he/she would in their absence.”110 But how do you determine 
which embryo will have the best possible life?  
    Conflict can arise between procreative beneficence and procreative autonomy. To 
illustrate this problem, Savulescu uses an example of two dwarfs who want to use 
IVF in order to have a child who is also a dwarf because their house is set up for 
dwarfs.111 They also wish the child to be a girl because they live in a society where 
discrimination against women is prevalent and they wish to have a girl to reduce this 
discrimination.112 “These choices would not harm the child produced if selection is 
employed. But they conflict with the principle of procreative beneficence.”113  In this 
situation, there should be a presumption in favour of reproductive for the purposes of 
public policy and so couples should be allowed to make their own decisions about 
which child they want.114 
    Sex selection for family balancing is not as vulnerable to the charge of sexism 
because the aim is to balance rather than at a particular sex.115 With family 
balancing, couples will not be able to use sex selection for their first couple of 
children and when they do take advantage of PGD for sex selection for family 
balancing they can only select the sex of the future child which is of the opposite sex 
to the existing children.  Couples would not be selecting the sex of their children 
because of sexism or the belief that one sex is better than the other. They would be 
selecting the sex for a variety of rearing experiences.116 This is supported by 
academics such as Savulescu and Dahl who have argued that “since their choice is 
simply based on the gender of already existing children and not on the absurd 
assumption that one sex is ‘superior’ to another, the claim that these couples are 
making a sexist choice is an unjustified accusation”.117 Some feminists find that 
choice of a child based upon sex is morally acceptable as long as the intentions and 
consequences of the practice is not sexist which is the case with sex selection for 
                                                          
110
 Herrisone-Kelly, P, ‘Procreative Beneficence and the Prospective Parent’, 2006, J Med Ethics, 
Vol.32, No.3, page 166. 
111
 See footnote 103.   
112
 ibid.  
113
 ibid.  
114
 ibid 425.  
115
 See footnote 30, page 384. 
116
 See footnote 82.   
117
 Savulescu and Dahl as quoted in Gavaghan, C, ‘Defending the Genetic Supermarket: Law and 
Ethics of Selecting the Next Generation’, 2007, Routledge-Cavendish, page 129.  
32 
 
family balancing.118 This implies that couples who want a child of a certain sex for 
family balancing reasons and for the different rearing experiences are not being 
sexist or believe that one sex is superior than the other.  
    It is argued that sex selection for family balancing will not be discriminatory. There 
is evidence, such as the Jack-in-the-box experiment, that there does exist biological 
differences between the two sexes and parents tend to only want to use sex 
selection techniques in order to experience the rearing of children of both sexes. It is 
suggested that there is a risk that sex selection for family balancing will reinforce 
gender stereotyping but if there were concerns that parents did have unreasonable 
expectations then they would be refused sex selection as one of the requirements of 
the process is that the welfare of any child born through reproductive technology will 
be considered. That sex selection for family balancing is discriminatory is not the 
only risk. 
 
Do Parents Love their Children Unconditionally? 
    It is argued that sex selection for family balancing should not become legal 
because parents should love their children unconditionally. This section will analyse 
this argument and show that this is not strong enough to justify the banning of sex 
selection for family balancing in the UK. It assumes parents have unconditional love 
for their children which is not true as when parents select against unhealthy embryos 
they are already putting conditions on which children they want to have. 
     The metaphor that children are gifts is used to convey something important about 
how the speaker believes parents should relate to their children, and the 
responsibilities this relationship involves.119 “In one study, Scully and her colleagues 
discovered that most people see their newborn child as a gift and not as a 
commodity. Many parents accept that they have little control over the foetus’ main 
characteristics and show love when the child is born.”120 But this might not always be 
the case. As reproductive technology advances will parents put more conditions on 
the child they want, such as, through gender, through sex, through health? 
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    In the traditional pattern of gift giving in the Western Europe culture, when 
someone gives you a gift you do not quibble about its specifications: you accept it 
unconditionally with gratitude.121 The notion of a gift then implies a lack of control 
over what is received.122 This argument is crucial because it implies that parents 
should accept and love their child no matter what and any interference by technology 
would be wrong because people do not reject gifts when they are not to their liking. 
They accept them graciously. However, according to this argument PGD should not 
be used in order for parents to have a healthy child, free of disease, because 
children are gifts and when parents use PGD in order to have a healthy child they 
are refusing a gift which nature has given them. Yet, most people would agree that 
PGD for medical reasons should be allowed and is ethically acceptable but sex 
selection for family balancing is not. The difference is that “parents may believe that 
they have a responsibility to prevent their children from suffering and living with an 
intolerable quality of life. Therefore, in this situation, there may be a tension between 
moral responsibility and unconditional acceptance.”123  Michael Sandel, an eminent 
Harvard political philosopher argues for reproductive choice to be limited as he firmly 
believes that it is a woman’s right to choose but objects to that choice being 
extended into the area of genetic selection. He claims that no parent has the right to 
choose their child even if that choice involves health instead of sickness.124 Because 
to choose a child is to deny that child its dignity and to give parents a mastery that 
defies “the giftedness of life”.125 Here Sandel’s meaning of the word choice is critical 
because he is saying that while it is right that a woman should choose whether she 
should carry a child to term or to have an abortion and hence whether a particular 
child is to have a life that choice does not extend into the area of choosing which 
child she carries based on certain requirements. It could be argued that most parents 
would disagree with Sandel’s view of not allowing parents to select embryos based 
on medical reasons because parents want the best for their children which means 
selecting embryos based on their health. It is suggested that most parents do not 
want to see their children suffer from a deadly disease and not have the ability to live 
life to the full and so sex selection should at least be legal for medical reasons.  
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    “Using reproductive technologies, such as PGD, involve selecting a particular 
human entity and discarding the others, an act which reflects conditional 
acceptance.”126 The love parents convey their children should have no condition. 
The child should not have to satisfy any condition to merit the parent’s love and if 
parents demand that their children should exhibit certain characteristics then their 
love is not genuinely unconditional.127 This is supported by Davis who expertly 
argues that: 
 
    “just as we should love existing children unconditionally, so we should  
     unconditionally accept whatever child we get in the course of things. If we set  
     conditions on which child we get, we are setting conditions on our love for  
     whatever child we get”.128  
 
However, if after three girls a couple has another girl, that does not necessarily mean 
that they will love that child any less because she was a girl, they just want to have 
the experience of rearing children of both sexes.129 
    Parental love should not be based upon the characteristics and talents the child 
exhibits. While we choose our friends and partners based on the qualities we find 
attractive in them, we do not choose our children. Their qualities are unpredictable 
and parents cannot be wholly responsible for the kind of children they have.130 While 
children must find their own path in life, it does not mean that parents must shrink 
from shaping and supporting the development of their children. As May points out, 
“parents give their children two kinds of love: accepting love and transforming love. 
Accepting love affirms the being of the child, whereas transforming love seeks the 
well-being of the child.”131 However, parents who are so fixated on having a girl or 
shops or a boy who fishes may find it difficult to leave the child to find their own 
interests and natural direction. Parents who go to great deal of trouble to have a boy 
who plays football may find it difficult when the child spurns the football pitch for a 
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dancing hall.132 Parents who have invested a great amount of physical, emotional 
and financial energy into having a child who conforms to their ideal may find it hard 
to let go and allow that child to make their own decisions about their life, especially 
so if they wish to go down a different path to that which their parents wished for 
them. Will the parent-child relationship suffer because the child does not conform to 
their parent’s gendered expectations? While there is a chance that parents have 
gendered expectations, as has been discussed at page 25, there is evidence which 
suggests that some characteristics are of biological origin and that parents wishing to 
use PGD for sex selection within the UK do so because they wish to experience the 
rearing of children of both sexes. Furthermore, prior to being allowed PGD for sex 
selection for family balancing parents will have to go through counselling and the 
welfare of the future child would have to be considered. If it was thought that parents 
had unreasonable expectations about having a child of a certain sex then they would 
be refused the treatment.  
    As Kant’s second part of his categorical imperative states: "act that you use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the 
same time as an end, never merely as a means.”133 This could be interpreted to 
mean that all humans are valuable in themselves and should never be used as a 
means to achieve something else i.e. they should never be treated as mere 
commodities. The saviour sibling’s cases can be used in order to show that parents 
selecting children for family balancing reasons is not treating children as 
commodities. There is a big difference between ‘saviour siblings’ and sex selection 
for family balancing which is that ‘saviour siblings’ are selected for a medical reason 
– to help save an existing ill child- and sex selection for family balancing is a non-
medical reason. But some of the arguments can be applied to sex selection for 
family balancing also. 
    A ‘saviour sibling’ case is that of Zain Hashmi.134 The HFEA gave permission for 
the Hashmi’s to have a saviour sibling in order to save Zain. This decision was 
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overturned in the High court but was eventually reinstated by the Court of Appeal in 
2003 declaring that tissue typing can be authorised under current legislation.135  “Mrs 
Hashmi has stated herself that 'Far from being made for spare parts these babies will 
be loved even more'.”136 This case raises a number of complex issues regarding how 
an embryo can be selected for an ulterior motive but can still be loved and cherished 
for themselves as well. However, how would the selected child feel knowing that they 
have been selected purely for the sake of saving another child? 
    It could be said that by selecting a saviour sibling it is saddled with the burden of 
knowing that they were created purely to save the life of an existing sibling. 
However, if the saviour sibling is loved and cherished for themselves then the saving 
of an ill sibling is positive. What is better than be able to save a life?137 If a child was 
selected at random or deliberately which was not a compatible donor the how would 
the resulting child feel that they were unable to save their sibling’s life? How would 
they cope with the guilt?138 While both of these arguments are valid, based upon 
Kant’s theory of ‘treating people as an ends’ selection for ‘saviour siblings’ should be 
allowed as long as the future child is seen as an end in themselves as well. If 
parents could not select a ‘saviour sibling’ in order to save an existing child then the 
risk is that they will continue to try naturally and if a child is born and is not a match 
then parents may resent that child for not being a match which could lead to a 
strained parent-child relationship. This argument could be applied to the issue of sex 
selection for family balancing. If parents cannot choose the sex of their children for 
family balancing reasons then they may continue to try naturally until they have a 
child of the desired sex. It could be argued that children born who are not of the 
desired sex may feel unloved and resented because they are not of the ‘right’ sex. 
The risk is that if parents did have access to this technology then existing children 
may feel unloved because they were not of the ‘right’ sex. However as Professor 
John Harris has stated:  
 
    'It is difficult ... to find evidence or even persuasive anecdotes that if people are  
                                                          
135
 Sheldon, S, and Wilkinson, S, ‘Should Saviour Siblings be Banned’, 2004, Journal of Medical 
Ethics, Vol.30 No. 6, page 533. 
136
 Alghrani, A, ‘Suitable to be a Saviour Sibling: R (Quintavalle) v Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority’, 2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol 18, No 3, page 419. 
137
 Alghrani, A, and Harris, J, ‘Reproductive Liberty: Should the Foundation of Families be 
Regulated?’,2006, Child and Family Law Quarterly, Vol.18, No.2, page 208. 
138
 ibid 209.  
37 
 
    treated as means, or exclusively as means or solely as means ... even if that were  
    to be the case, even if we could make sense of this idea, the children would be  
    also unloved and treated so unacceptably badly that it would cause psychological  
    damage is a piece of reckless speculation for which there is no evidence.'”139   
 
Even if it was thought that parents had unreasonable expectations and who would 
only see their child as a commodity to further their own gendered expectations they 
would be refused treatment under the welfare of the child principle. 
    Kant has no objection to using people as a means. As the Kant scholar H. J. 
Paton points out that when we post a letter we use a post-office official but we do not 
use them simply as a means.140 There is a big difference to using people as a means 
and using them solely as a means.  In regard to reproduction, couples often have 
children for a variety of reasons; to save a marriage or to strengthen a relationship or 
to carry on the family business or to provide an existing child with a sibling. Is 
deliberately having a child for whatever reason better than accidently conceiving as 
more often than not, people have children for no reason at all, many pregnancies 
being unplanned.141 Parents who conceive naturally can do so for whatever reason 
they choose. Those who go through PGD have to have a valid reason and at the 
moment the only valid legal reason in the UK is a medical one. Having a child to 
save another child may be a better reason than most but yet we do not prevent 
reproduction for the above reasons. It would be wrong to create a saviour sibling and 
then to just discard it when it has saved the life of the existing child but this is not 
what is being suggested.142 Arguably while sex selection for family balancing is not 
as valid a reason as having a child to save a child, the Kantian reasoning could still 
be applied to allow sex selection for family balancing because as long as parents 
see the child as an end in themselves as well, then sex selection for family balancing 
could be ethical from the Kantian perspective.  
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    The disadvantage to this theory is that as long as parents see their child as an end 
in themselves and not as a mere commodity, then this theory would sanction 
selection of embryos for anything parents desire in their child. It does not distinguish 
between having a child to save the life of another child and saving a marriage.143 If 
technology advances and designer babies became a reality then this theory would 
sanction the selection of eye colour, hair colour, intelligence, sporting ability etc. 
Designer babies will be discussed at page 44. It could be argued that allowing 
parents this freedom to select these kinds of characteristics would effectively result 
in allowing them to design their own child to their own satisfaction. Parents may lose 
sight of the fact that the child is a means in itself also. With sex selection for family 
balancing, parents only choose which embryos should be implanted because they 
want to experience the rearing of both sexes and if they did have unreasonable 
expectations of their future child they would be refused treatment. Parent’s selection 
of characteristics such as intelligence or hair colour is going too far. 
    Kant’s theory can be compared to Derek Parfit’s non-identity principle which holds 
that selection for any trait whether for medical or non-medical reasons would be 
ethical, even if the potential child is not seen as an end it itself. Parfit’s theory hold 
that as long as the child which is conceived does not have a life worse than if they 
had not been created than the child can be said not to have been harmed. It is called 
the Non-identity principle because it is about the inability to identify the relevant 
individual which has been harmed. We have not harmed the specific child by our 
pre-conception decisions and actions because a change in our decisions or actions 
would have resulted in a different child being conceived.144 In order to explain his 
theory Parfit used an example of a pregnant 14 year old girl: 
 
    “This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child a  
     bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout the child’s life, his or  
     her life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several years,  
     she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a better start       
     in life.”145  
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The question would then be whether the child of the 14-year-old girl is likely to be 
born into a life so terrible that it would have been better for that child never to have 
been born. As Parfit suggests, we should ask “if someone lives a life that is worth 
living, is it worse for this person than if it had never existed?” concluding that 
inevitably ‘our answer must be “No”’.146 This is Parfit’s famous non-identity problem 
    This principle essentially relies on the basis that if this girl had waited and got 
pregnant later in her life then the embryo would be different and would grow up to be 
a different person because it would result from different gametes and so the future 
embryo cannot blame her mother for giving her a bad start to life as if her mother 
had waited she would never have been born. Bernard Williams refers to this as the 
zygote principle because the identity of human beings lies in the union of two given 
gametes: if either the sperm or the ovum or both had been different, a different 
human being would have been created and born.147 “There can be no claims to 
anyone having been harmed by any genetic choices that are made pre-conception, 
so long as one has a life worth living, because any variation in genetic origin would 
have resulted in an entirely different person being conceived.”148 However, what is 
meant by a ‘life worth living’? 
    In normal cases where the woman’s actions have negatively affected the already 
existing foetus, the wrong is straightforward as the woman violates the child’s rights 
in a harmful way but in the non-identity case, if the woman violates the right of the 
future child, she has seemed not to have harmed him or her.149  Conditions which 
could be classed as a life not worth living include being permanently unconscious in 
a persistent vegetative state, having life prolonging treatment withdrawn on the basis 
that continued treatment  would not be in their best interest. Children born through 
sex selective technology cannot complain because to do so would mean that they 
have a life worse than death and this is not the case. This theory does not take into 
account the welfare of the child. Any sex selection no matter what reason would be 
ethical as long as the child did not have a life worse than death. However, the 
welfare of the child born is an important consideration when dealing with genetics 
and reproductive technology. It cannot just be dismissed. It could be argued that 
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parents who have unreasonable expectations for their children and want to use 
reproductive technology to achieve those expectations need to be screened out or 
else it  may result in the first step being taken towards treating children as 
commodities and allowing parents too much control over their children. 
    The non-identity principle is best reflected in the current debate about whether 
parents should deliberately select an embryo which will have a disability. Imagine the 
scenario that there are two embryos: embryo A and embryo B. If embryo A is 
implanted it will be born deaf, but will be healthy in every other aspect. If embryo B is 
implanted it will be born healthy and with the ability to hear. There is no way that 
embryo A can be born without being deaf due to its genetic makeup. If embryo A is 
implanted it would not have been harmed by being deaf because it has not been 
made worse off.150   Existence as a deaf child is generally not considered to be 
worse than non-existence.151 This can be compared to the case of a hearing child 
who has been deliberately deafened as he/she would have been able to continue to 
live as a hearing child and consequently he/she has been harmed as they have been 
made worse off by the choice to make them deaf.152                                                                                                                              
     Parents who seek to provide the best for their children and spare no effort in 
order to help them achieve happiness and success are usually admired. Some 
parents confer advantages on their children by sending them to expensive schools or 
providing them with piano lessons, ballet lessons or swimming lessons. If these 
actions are permissible by parents and admired by others then why is it not equally 
admirable for parents to use whatever genetic technologies may emerge (provided 
they are safe) to enhance their children's talents?153 Where do we draw the line 
between parents supporting and developing their children’s talents and choosing 
their children’s talents? It is argued that we allow parents to make huge decisions on 
their children’s behalf when they are young, from deciding which immunisations they 
have to deciding which extracurricular activities they go to but yet we find it ethically 
wrong for parents to choose which non-medical characteristics their children should 
have prior to birth. Genetic manipulation is somehow worse and more intrusive than 
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other ways parents seek to enhance their children’s talents. However, morally 
speaking, the difference is less significant than it seems as bioengineering makes us 
question the low-tech, high-pressure child-rearing practices we commonly accept.154 
    However, are parents choosing the sex of their children for family balancing 
reasons preventing those children from having an open future and depriving them of 
their autonomy?  A party which is affected by parents’ reproductive decisions and 
should be taken into account is the future child.  ‘Choice’ is always considered as 
belonging to the parents rather than any future child which is understandable as in 
assisted reproduction the child does not yet exist and so cannot by definition have a 
voice and it seems reasonable to assume that the option of being born outweighs in 
all situations to the alternative.155 It could be argued that sex selection for family 
balancing does affect the child once it is born because there is a risk that parents 
want a child of a certain sex because of gendered expectations and may not allow 
the child to develop their own interests and hobbies. However, in the UK clinics have 
to consider the welfare of the future children before parents can proceed with the 
fertility treatment. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three, page 72. 
     Sex selection for family balancing may result in “prospective parents seeing their 
future child as a vehicle for fulfilling their own life goals without seriously considering 
the relationship they will have with the child.”156 Parents may have strong 
expectations that the future child will join the family business or attend the mother’s 
school or be a “chip off the old block” but assisted reproduction is startling “wake up 
call” for a more critique of our current high pressure rearing experiences. There are 
many ways in which parents attempt to narrow their children’ right to an open future 
such as encouraging a child to specialise early in one sport or taking piano 
lessons.157 It is argued that if we allow parents these high-pressure child-rearing 
practices, why do we not allow parents the freedom to select the sex of their children 
for family balancing reasons?  Just because parents choose to implant certain 
embryos based upon the sex does not mean that the future child will not have an 
open future and be able to have their own wishes and desires. The same cannot be 
said for some of these child-rearing practices, for example from an early age they 
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know they will have to take over the family business and so cannot choose a career 
for themselves.   
    It is automatically assumed that all parents have unconditional love for their 
children. This may not always be the case. “In the context of reproduction, there are 
prospective parents who do not want their child at all, or who pose a threat to the 
health of the future child, for example, by smoking, drinking alcohol or consuming 
drugs.”158 Parents attempt to correct anti-social behaviour or bad manners displayed 
by children and failure for children to follow their parents’ moral guidance may result 
in a tension building in the parent-child relationship which could cause alienation and 
separation.159 The UK allows sex selection for medical reasons and “when there is a 
risk that the future child will be born with a serious illness or disability many parents 
prefer not to have the child. Does this not suggest conditional acceptance?”160  It is 
argued that parents’ may feel not only responsible for the quality of life their child 
could have but also for the range of opportunities available to them and for other 
existing children of the family. If this is correct the tension may arise between moral 
responsibility and unconditional acceptance.161 
    It is argued that children cannot choose their parents’ characteristics, such as sex, 
but children still accept them for who they are and show love and affection for them 
so why should parents’ be allowed to select their children’s characteristics?162 
However, if parents cannot select the sex of their children then this can have long 
term affects for the parent-child relationship. “If the parents already have a number of 
children of the same sex, their sense of frustration, disappointment and even anger 
when a fifth of the same sex is born may adversely influence not only the relationship 
with the newborn child but with the older children as well.”163 Would it not be better 
for a child to be wanted and to be born into a loving and stable environment? It could 
be suggested that with sex selection for family balancing this would be the case 
whereas if parents continued to try naturally there is no guarantee that this would 
happen. 
    The unconditional love objection is a strong argument against sex selection for 
family balancing because it implies that parents should love their children regardless 
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of their characteristics or disabilities. This is not always the case. In the UK we allow 
parents to select against unhealthy embryos which suggests conditional acceptance. 
Yet, parents may want to ensure that they can give a child the best quality of life and 
not just a life which is tolerable.  This is not the only way parents put conditions on 
their children. Some parents do not want their children at all or pose a threat by 
smoking or drinking through pregnancy. This does not suggest unconditional love. 
Further, it is argued that sex selection for family balancing prevents those children 
from having an open future. Parents only select which embryos to implant based 
upon the sex, when those children are born they can still choose their own future. 
Sometimes children who are born naturally do not have an entirely open future 
because of high-pressure child-rearing practices but we do not stop these so why 
should sex selection for family balancing be prevented. It is argued that children who 
are born through sex selection can still be loved unconditionally, even though they 
are selected because of an ulterior motive. 
 
Slippery Slope 
    There is the belief that allowing sex selection for family balancing is the beginning 
of the slippery slope towards designer babies. The phrase “designer baby” is often 
used to describe children who have been created through genetic technology to their 
parents’ specifications. Opponents morally condemn designer babies because they 
assume that parents are more concerned with fashion and pleasing themselves then 
they are with valuing and loving the child for its’ own sake.164 
    The issues and concerns of designer babies were clearly presented in the film 
Gattaca. This film, Gattaca, presents a future where parents have used technology 
to select every possible trait for their children before they were born. “One of the 
most memorable lines of the film is that “people used to say that a child conceived in 
love has a better chance of happiness. They don’t say that anymore.””165 There are 
various issues and concerns which arise from the selection of non-medical traits in 
                                                          
164
  Vacco, L, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to Customizing 
Children. Can the Technology be Regulated Based Upon the Parent’s Intent?’, 2004-2005, 49 St. 
Louis U. L.J. page 1194. See Harmon, S, ‘The Significance of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on 
the Human Genome and Human Rights’, 2005, SCRIPTed, Vol. 21, page 21 for a brief discussion on 
the technological advancement of genetics and its potential consequences. 
165
 Vacco, L, ‘Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: From Preventing Genetic Disease to Customizing 
Children. Can the Technology be Regulated Based Upon the Parent’s Intent?’, 2004-2005, 49 St. 
Louis U. L.J. page 1181.  
44 
 
embryos and these will be discussed and analysed within this section and will show 
that the notion of designer babies should not be allowed to affect whether sex 
selection for family balancing should become legal within the UK. 
    The phrase designer babies is inaccurate to describe children who have been 
born through PGD as Chloe O’Brien was not ‘designed’ by her parents. Rather she 
or was selected from a number of candidates, but nothing at all was done to alter her 
genetic disposition.166 Chloe was selected out of a number of potential embryos 
based upon the fact that she did not carry the cystic fibrosis gene. At the moment it 
is not possible to alter an embryo’s genetic disposition, but what about the 
technology of the future?  
    It is thought that changes in technology will soon permit whole genome embryo 
screening as a routine part of in vitro fertilization and may allow  parents’ who are 
testing their embryos for conventional reasons to test for other traits at a little 
additional cost.167 Parents who have the financial resources may become 
increasingly selective about which non-medical traits their children should have 
leading to higher levels of perfection.168 At the moment it is not possible to screen for 
most behavioural and physical traits.169 However, the potential does exist. 
Reproductive technology is a fast moving area and new things are being discovered 
every day. Just a few days ago there was a breakthrough in human cloning which 
allowed scientists to produce early embryos which marks a significant step for 
science.170 “The cloned embryos were used as a source of stem cells, which can 
make new heart muscle, bone, brain tissue or any other type of cell in the body.”171 
“Stem cells are one of the greatest hopes for medicine. Being able to create new 
tissue might be able to heal the damage caused by a heart attack or repair a severed 
spinal cord.”172 This breakthrough shows that new things are being discovered all the 
time and selection for non-medical traits such as intelligence or sporting ability may 
not be too far in the future. 
    A major concern is genetic enhancement will not allow us to act freely and 
undermine our capacity succeed and fail on our own. It is one thing to score 95% on 
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a test but it is completely different if we scored 95% because our parents paid for us 
to have a higher level of intelligence. As genetic enhancement increases, our 
admiration for achievement will fade or even shifts towards the doctors who have 
ensured that we have certain traits.173 The concern is that human nature is being 
remade to suit our own desires and it may destroy our appreciation of the gifted 
character of human powers and achievements.174 Achievements will no longer be 
down to natural ability but how much money parents have invested in their children. 
Children who were created naturally may pale into comparison to genetically 
enhanced children. They will have no hope of ever winning a race, or being top of 
the class etc. Two classes of people will start to form, the enhanced and the merely 
natural.175 Furthermore, it may widen the gap between the wealthy and the poor 
because it will only be the wealthy which will be able to afford to select non-medical 
traits in their children. “Selection of embryos based on intelligence, physical, or 
psychological traits would contribute to inequality in society by circumventing the 
natural random process of evolution.”176 This will be discussed in further detail in the 
following chapter at page 55. 
    It could be argued that children may suffer from psychological and self-esteem 
issues because their parents oversaw every part of them. Parents may choose traits 
in their children which makes them more competitive in society but success in 
competition and actual contentment may be dramatically different. 177. Children will 
begin to feel like commodities instead of human beings with their own feelings and 
desires. It is said that cloning is ethically unacceptable because it violates the right to 
autonomy; by choosing a child's genetic makeup in advance, parents deny the 
child's right to an open future.  This can be compared to genetic enhancement where 
parents have chosen their children’s characteristics. Selection for musical talent or 
athletic prowess, would point children toward particular choices, and so designer 
children would never be fully free.178 Directed procreation has the potential to turn 
into virtual entitlement. At the moment parents can hope that they have a child of a 
certain sex or have a boy who will play football but if those parents pay huge sums of 
money and invest a great deal of time and effort into ensuring that they definitely 
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have a child of a certain sex or a boy who has above average talent in the football 
field then they are more likely to feel entitled to the desired result or find it more 
difficult to allow their child to develop their interests.179By selecting which non-
medical traits their children will have parents may be putting those children under a 
great pressure to conform to their ideal child. If genetically manipulated children 
should ever wish to defer from their parents’ life plan, they may be constantly 
reminded that their parents have paid a vast amount of money for them to have 
these specific characteristics. This could cause a lot of frustration and arguments 
between the parties involved especially if they decide not to pursue the career which 
their parents have chosen for them or even, if they do not make it. Resentment and 
pressure may be the main emotions involved in the parent-child relationship instead 
of love and compassion. However, an argument against this is that if parents do not 
choose their children’s characteristics then the children are free to choose their own 
characteristics for themselves but none of use chooses our genetic inheritance.180 To 
inherit genetic characteristics is one thing but for parents to pay money and 
genetically alter their children’s make-up are two different things. 
    It is assumed that unrestrained access to PGD would result in blonde-haired, blue-
eyed children but this is most often encountered in newspaper letters pages and 
radio phone-ins than in serious bioethical discourse, but the spectre of eugenics 
haunts most discussions of this topic.”181 This is supported by Professor Philip 
Kitcher, who has suggested that, “interfering with prenatal decisions about which 
foetuses to keep and which to lose would amount to a centrally-directed eugenics 
programme comparable to Nazi Germany.”182 Eugenics was once a term which 
suggested scientific promise, public health improvements but now it represents 
injustice and an abrogation of basic liberties. To say that a practice is eugenic is to 
deem it morally problematic and abusive.183 However, the crucial point is that 
“couples without the requisite genes for blue eyes or blond hair will quite simply be 
unable to pass those traits on to their offspring, however many embryos they 
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conceive.”184 Parents will only be able to pass genes onto their children which they 
themselves carry. They will not be able to sit down with a catalogue of characteristics 
and be able to pick and choose which characteristics they would like their future 
children to have. Design in this sense is not possible.  Tests will be performed on the 
embryos created in order to determine what characteristics each embryo will have if 
it is born. Parents will only be able to choose which embryos are implanted based 
upon the results of the tests. However, there is speculation that some genes may be 
enhanced or manipulated in the future creating ‘designer babies’. 
    In the 1990s scientists managed to manipulate memory-linked genes in fruit flies 
and more recently scientists have produced smart mice by inserting extra copies of 
memery-linked genes into mouse embryos resulting in photographic memories. The 
result is that mice have learned more quickly and remember things longer than 
normal mice can and extra copies were programmed to remain active even in old 
age, and the improvement was passed on to offspring.185 Human memory is more 
complicated but if it did become possible to have memory-enhancing drugs for 
humans then there would be potential life altering changes. It could be used for 
people who suffer from Alzheimer’s or encounter memory loss which comes naturally 
with old age but it could also have non-medical uses, for example, helping a lawyer 
cram for an upcoming trial or a business executive eager to learn Mandarin on the 
eve of his departure for Shanghai. 186 This could be a huge development for science 
and reproduction and may result in both good and bad consequences for society. On 
the one hand, it would enable people suffering from Alzhimer’s and dementia to 
retain their memory but on the other hand it would allow people to memorise a vast 
amount of information in a short space of time which may have terrible as well as 
unforeseen consequences, for example, memorising classified information and using 
for it for illegal gains. However, can sex selection for family balancing be compared 
to genetic manipulation for intelligence or for any other non-medical trait? The 
answer is no. Selection for sex will not have the same consequences for society as 
would selection for intelligence. Parents may choose which embryos to implant 
based upon their sex but that would be the extent of their choice. The embryo is not 
altered to suit parents’ desires and wishes which may have life altering 
                                                          
184
 See footnote 83, page 8.  
185
 See footnote 130.  
186
 ibid.  
48 
 
consequences which are not yet realised, for example, take the birth of Dolly the 
cloned sheep who died a premature death.187 Allowing parents to choose 
characteristics of their children may have long term consequences which are as yet 
unknown – do we really want to take that risk? These consequences could be 
dangerous and irreversible and alter the biology of life forms, the ecology and natural 
evolution.188 
        The UK allows sex selection for medical reasons but not for non-medical 
reasons. Why is it that as a society we find it ethically and morally acceptable to 
select the sex of children based on medical reasons but not for non-medical 
reasons?  PGD is ethically controversial whether it is for medical or non-medical 
reasons as it involves the screening and likely destruction of embryos, and the 
selection of children on the basis of expected traits.189At one end of the scale there 
are those who believe that all sex selection is wrong, and should be illegal. These 
opinions are mainly driven by how many potential lives will be lost and that humans 
should not “play God”. At the other end of the scale there are libertarians who may 
either favour a ‘free market’ in sex selection, or perhaps a lightly regulated market: 
one controlled just enough to ensure technical competence and fair dealing.190  In 
between there are various other ideas. One of these is the present regulation of sex 
selection in the UK. 
    Sex selection for medical reasons may lead to parents to start selecting against 
diseases which are mild in nature. Davis uses the term “selection drift” which is the 
drift towards the mild end of a spectrum that has very severe medical problems at 
one end and very mild conditions, or even above average traits, at the other. Those 
who believe that parents should have unconditional live for their children believe that 
selection is wrong anywhere along the spectrum (except perhaps when the condition 
is worse than death).191We should love and accept any child unconditionally no 
matter what their characteristics are. If we start setting conditions on which children 
we want then we are setting conditions on our love for those children.192 This could 
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be compared with the recent debate on prenatal testing and termination for Down 
syndrome which shares similar ethical concerns for the use of PGD for the selection 
of deadly and mild diseases. Those who have Down syndrome often have mild or 
manageable mental and physical impairments.193 This may result in pressure being 
put onto parents which may lead to a high rate of termination of Down Syndrome 
pregnancies which reduces the number of individuals living with Down Syndrome 
and in turn may lead to the stigmatization of those living with Down Syndrome.194 
This can be compared with the disability debate. “Many disability rights activists and 
those with disabilities oppose sex selection, fearing that the smaller population of 
persons born with disabilities would face increased stigmatization. Disability activists 
also dispute the basic assumption that disabilities are so undesirable as to require 
their complete elimination”.195 “Asch argues that the same arguments apply to PGD: 
"As currently practiced and justified, prenatal testing and embryo selection cannot 
comfortably coexist with society's professed goals of promoting inclusion and 
equality for people with disabilities."196 Based upon this argument it would be wrong 
to select for sex or disability but yet we find it acceptable to select against disability 
and thus not promoting inclusion and equality and its unacceptable to select the sex 
of children for family balancing because it would not be promoting equality.  
    It could be argued that sex selection for medical reasons may also lead parents to 
select against embryos where there is only the potential that the disease will 
develop. People can have a genetic mutation which is associated with a particular 
disease, such as hereditary breast cancer, does not automatically mean that the 
disease will develop. Children who have these mutations may remain healthy for 
decades and if symptoms did begin to appear then a cure or treatment could have 
been discovered in the meantime.197 PGD could be used to screen embryos carrying 
the p53 or BRCA1&2 mutations which could result in the destruction of embryos who 
would have a greatly increased chance of developing cancer. PGD for these 
mutations or for Alzheimer’s prevents the birth of children who would remain healthy 
until their 40s or 50s before they will experience symptoms leading to an early 
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death.198 Parents who select against embryos who will have these conditions later in 
life reflect the desire of parents to have children with good prospects for healthy and 
long life. But if PGD is used to test for early onset genetic disorders then it should be 
accepted that testing should be done for later onset conditions as well. 199 However, 
if we rely on the argument that sex selection for family balancing is wrong because it 
will lead to healthy embryos being discarded, then selection for certain diseases 
should also be wrong because there is no certainty that the disease will develop if 
the embryo lived. 
    It is argued that sex selection for medical reasons is justified because we are 
selecting for children who will be free from disease and who will have a healthy and 
long life whereas sex selection for non-medical reasons is satisfying parents’ desires 
and whims. However, the medical risks are the same for both medical and non-
medical sex selection.  If a woman is willing to undergo the physical and emotional 
burdens of PGD and IVF, then she should be allowed to select the sex of the child 
for family balancing reasons. Robertson has argued that it is sometimes acceptable 
for parents to choose the sex of their children when there is a good reason to believe 
that the parents are fully informed about the procedure and counselled about having 
unrealistic gender expectations.200  As parents are allowed to select the sex of 
children to be free from mild diseases and even from diseases which may not 
develop until later in life and in certain cases may not even develop then should 
parents not be allowed to select the sex of their children for family balancing 
reasons. Not all the embryos which are discarded will be unhealthy and yet we find 
this acceptable for medical reasons but not for family balancing reasons? 
    At the moment designer babies are not possible. It is claimed that there is 
evidence which suggests that at some point in the future, science will evolve and 
technology will be created which allows parents to pick which characteristics their 
children will have. But we should be more concerned about the here and now and 
currently parents who want to take advantage of sex selection technology do so 
because of family balancing reasons. It is argued that sex selection for family 
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balancing should not be illegal because there is the possibility of designer babies in 
the future. 
 
Conclusion of Chapter 
    It is suggested that sex selection for family balancing reasons should become 
legal within the UK as most couples wanting access to PGD for sex selection do so 
because of family balancing reasons.  It is believed that parents want to be able to 
experience the rearing of children of both sexes. Psychologists now recognise many 
biologically based differences between male and female children, including different 
patterns of aggression, learning, and spatial recognition, as well as hormonal 
differences. Sex selection for family balancing will not alter the sex ratio because 
parents will have to have at least two or three children before they can access the 
technology and they will only be able to select the sex which is opposite to the sex of 
the child they already have. However, there are many concerns with allowing sex 
selection for family balancing. Firstly, it may be discriminatory against females. 
Secondly, there is the risk that any child born may have gender dysphoria. Thirdly, 
sex selection for family balancing does not conform to the idea that parents should 
love their children unconditionally. Fourthly, allowing sex selection for family 
balancing may be the beginning of the slippery slope towards designer babies. It 
could be argued that these risks could produce the conclusion that sex selection for 
family balancing should be banned. However, it may be suggested that these risks 
are not strong enough to justify the limiting of parents’ reproductive liberty in 
selecting the sex of their children for non-medical reasons. I suggest that the UK 
should take the position that parents should allow parents the freedom to select the 
sex of their children for family balancing reasons only. This position takes into 
account both sides of the argument by allowing parents’ some control over the sex of 
their children but that it is not totally unlimited. This would allow parents to have 
reproductive autonomy within a set of strong rules and regulations which will enable 
the state to ensure that reproductive technology advances at an appropriate rate and 
does not lead to the conclusion of designer babies. If parents do have unreasonable 
expectations of any children they may have through assisted reproduction then they 
can be prevented from using the technology for sex selection because of the welfare 
of the future child. However, the socio-economic factors do need to be taken into 
account also. 
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Chapter 2 
The Socio-Economic Factors 
     
    Allowing sex selection for family balancing may have social and economic 
consequences for the UK. Continuing to ban sex selection for family balancing could 
result in couples travelling abroad to seek the treatment they require but to legalise 
sex selection for family balancing may result in questions regarding how it should be 
funded and if it is funded privately will there be a widening of the gap between the 
rich and the poor. This chapter will analyse these issues and aim to show that sex 
selection for family balancing should be privately funded and it will not result in a 
widening of the gap between the rich and the poor because parents will only be 
choosing which embryos to implant based upon sex. They would not be able to 
choose which characteristics their future children will have, such as a higher 
intelligence or sporting ability, which will give them a head start on children born 
naturally. 
 
Reproductive Tourism 
    Reproductive tourism is the willingness of citizens to travel abroad in order to seek 
assisted reproductive technology.201 Couples take advantage of reproductive tourism 
because of the restrictive law in their own country or because of the cost.202 Some 
say that the internet plays a huge role in reproductive tourism. Clinics abroad which 
offer sex selection techniques often have websites which can be found by couples by 
simply typing “clinics offering sex selection” into a search engine.203 A simple Google 
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search returns 16,300,000 results. These websites are also written in various 
languages which makes it easier for say English prospective travellers to find clinics 
in Greece which offer sex selection services.204 Traditional word of mouth has played 
a significant role in facilitating reproductive tourism but digital word of mouth has 
dramatically increased the speed and scope of patient information sharing.205  
    In the past few years reproductive tourism has increased which has been 
highlighted in the media. In 2011 the Daily Mail published an article concerning the 
lengths parents will go to in order to select the sex of their children.206 As sex 
selection for non-medical reasons is illegal within the UK, parents wishing to select 
the sex of their children have to do so by travelling abroad to another country, such 
as the United States, where PGD is easy to arrange without even a medical 
referral.207 In 2010 the Guardian published an article detailing the facts of two 
instances where parents have travelled abroad in order to select the sex of their 
baby. The first case involved a couple named the Gunns’ who had three small boys 
and wanted a girl.208  The second case involved a couple named the Trathens who 
had four boys and wanted a girl.209  Both these cases imply that there are couples in 
the UK who seek sex selection for family balancing reasons and if they have the 
resources they will go to extreme lengths to have a child of a certain sex. They do so 
even though there is a risk that they will not have a baby at the end of the treatment 
as couples are still subject to the same percentage of IVF working as couples who 
are receiving IVF for fertility reasons. Despite this risk couples are willing to pay and 
this is realised by the assisted reproductive community. Fertility doctors have 
become influential stakeholders who use a combination of medical and commercial 
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practices to enhance their market positions.210  Cross-border movements are 
sometimes facilitated by clinics or brokers at home who have partnerships 
abroad”.211  Even though sex selection for non-medical reasons is illegal in the UK 
there are clinics, such as the Rainsbury Clinic, which help couples travel abroad for 
sex selective treatment.212 Clinics like these find effective ways in order to help 
couples to overcome issues of distance and minimise time and travel costs.213 This 
not only promotes sex selection abroad but also allows couples to exercise their 
reproductive autonomy which they may not be able to in their own country because 
of restrictive laws.214  
    The question which then arises is whether the UK can prevent couples from 
travelling abroad to select the sex of their baby?  While prosecuting couples 
travelling abroad for treatment has been unknown, Turkey has recently announced 
that it would imprison women up to three years if they seek to become pregnant 
through IVF abroad and that regulations would be in place to prevent Turkish clinics 
from serving as agents for foreign infertility clinics.215 This principle is called 
extraterritoriality and simply refers “to the application of the laws of one country to 
persons, conduct or relationships outside of that country”.216 However, prosecuting 
couples travelling abroad to select the sex of their baby would be quite difficult. 
Firstly, there would be no signs when the couple are travelling that they are on route 
to select the sex of their baby through PGD. Secondly, clinics abroad would have no 
incentive to inform the couple’s authorities in their home country.217 Thirdly, when the 
couple arrive back in the UK and find out that the woman is pregnant they can just 
inform their doctor that they have conceived naturally. Support against penalising 
British couples travelling abroad for reproductive treatment has come from Professor 
Margaret Brazier who has argued that no system could eliminate procreative tourism 
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and this was supported by the House of Commons who has stated that any attempts 
to prevent reproductive tourism would not be justified by the seriousness of the 
offence.218 It could be argued that penalising couples travelling abroad for 
reproductive treatment would be a waste of time and resources as prohibition of 
reproductive tourism would not prevent couples who are determined to select the sex 
of their baby from doing so. They may view the risk is worth taking and prosecution 
of these couples would be difficult due to the lack of evidence.  
    The willingness of couples to seek sex selective treatment abroad rather than 
abide by the law in their own country suggests that prohibition of sex selection for 
non-medical reasons is not that effective.219  It is argued that if parents are going to 
access sex selective technology anyway then it might as well be in their own country 
where there is a properly regulated health care system rather than allow them to 
suffer the cost, inconvenience and risk of treatment abroad.220 
    Those who have the money and resources like the Trathens and Gunns do 
exercise their reproductive autonomy by travelling abroad and selecting the sex of 
their baby, mostly for family balancing reasons. The advantage of travelling abroad 
for sex selection is that it allows couples to be private about the treatment they are 
seeking. “Disguising an absence from work for treatment abroad as a ‘holiday’ can 
be helpful for those who did not wish to divulge treatment to employers or family 
members”.221 The disadvantage is that reproductive tourism is only an option for 
those who can afford it. Allowing sex selection for family balancing in the UK may 
slightly reduce the cost of treatment which may allow more couples a better chance 
to access the technology and not just the very wealthy.  
 
Inequality between the wealthy and the poor 
    A crucial social consequence of allowing non-medical sex selection is that it may 
result in there being an inequality between the rich and the poor because of the 
expensive nature of PGD and a gap is already beginning to form between those who 
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can afford to select the sex of their baby for non-medical reasons and those who 
cannot. According to the UK Cypriot Fertility Association website the cost of PGD 
with your own eggs is approximately £12, 485. £200 for a consultation, £685 for 
screening (both male and female), £1,300 for medication depending on need, £1,300 
for treatment and £9,000 for the Cyprus fee.222 This shows that for most being able 
to select the sex of your baby is out of reach and the only course of action left is to 
continue to ‘try’ naturally until they get the result which they wish for. This is just the 
beginning and as reproductive technology advances there is a high possibility that 
doctors will be able to test for more and more characteristics and thus widening the 
gap between the rich and the poor even more because it will probably only be the 
wealthy who can afford it.223 However, should non-medical sex selection be banned 
because it is the first step on the slippery towards designer babies which may 
enhance the gap between the rich and the poor? This section will show that sex 
selection for family balancing will allow more couples the opportunity to access the 
technology and allow them to experience the rearing of children of both sexes if they 
so wish.  
    Through genetic enhancement “parents will not only be able to produce an athletic 
superstar, but they could also create a physically attractive child, a theatrical prodigy, 
a strong wrestling champion, or a mathematical genius”.224 It is assumed that 
parents want to give their children the best start in life and if that was achieved 
through the use of genetic enhancement technology then they would use it if given 
the opportunity.225 However, this may lead children to be treated as commodities and 
not be loved unconditionally by their parents. The more characteristics parents select 
the less likely children will have of an open future. Even without genetic 
enhancement technology children born to rich parents would probably have more 
opportunities than children born to poor parents. This can be seen through George 
Monbiot’s analogy between ‘choosing your children’s genes’ and ‘choosing to 
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educate them privately’.226 Parents who send their children to fee-paying schools 
attempt to give their children a better start in life than their peers. As fee-paying 
schools are only open to those children whose parents can afford them and some 
only to the affluent minority it might be thought that these schools seek to reinforce 
the privileged position of those who attend them by giving them a high-quality 
education as well as a potentially lucrative network of contacts for later in life.227 It is 
believed that in the same way that rich parents can afford to give their children a 
head start in life by sending them to private schools, rich parents will be able to 
afford to select which characteristics they would like their children to possess. 
Children will not only be born with silver spoons in their mouths but also with ‘golden 
genes in their chromosomes’.228 This may effectively allow parents to give their 
children an even bigger advantage over those who are less fortunate. Tamara 
Garcia and Roland Sandler say that: 
 
    “Those who can afford the technology when it first becomes available will enjoy a  
     compounding benefit: the increased capabilities that the technology provides […]  
     will further advantage the individual (who is already advantaged in virtue of their  
     position and resources, which provided them access to the technologies) in  
     pursuit of competitive and positional goods that are relevant to one’s quality of  
     life”.229  
 
While this would give children born to rich parents an even bigger advantage over 
those born to poorer parents, could we prevent parents from giving their children the 
best possible start in life, even if it means widening the gap between the rich and the 
poor?  
    As was discussed in the previous chapter, Savulescu’s principle of procreative 
beneficence maintains that “parents should select the child of the best possible 
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children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a 
life as the others, based on the relevant, available information”.230 Savluescu argues 
that based upon this principle parents should select non-medical traits in their 
children even if it causes social inequality.231 However, while non-medical sex 
selection only causes inequality between those who can afford it and those who 
cannot , allowing selection for non-medical traits may have far reaching effects 
because it not only effects those who can afford the technology but it also has social 
and economic consequences. It is assumed that children selected for non-medical 
traits would have the better careers and lifestyle while those who were not selected 
would do the menial jobs and may even struggle financially. It is argued that 
eventually a cycle will form where rich parents will select to have the best children 
possible and when those children grow up and have children they will select to have 
the best children possible also and the cycle continues.  This may result in a barrier 
forming where those from the lower-classes will never be able to have the higher 
paid jobs or the best sporting ability. They may be viewed as lacking the socially 
desirable traits.232 
    Still, at the moment it is not possible to screen for non-medical traits such as 
intelligence and there is no clear link between such traits and particular genes.233 But 
research does continue in this area and there is the possibility that in the future 
scientists will find the link and designer babies will be a reality. If this is so, an 
important fact needs to be remembered and that is that the wealthy will only be able 
to select the traits in their children that they themselves carry.PGD is not genetic 
modification as it does not add or remove anything from the genes possessed by the 
couple’s embryos.234 Even though the rich may have the resources to select these 
traits they cannot do so unless they themselves carry the genes they wish to select 
for. For example, if a wealthy couple wish to select a child with a high aptitude for 
maths unless they themselves have the gene for a high aptitude for maths they will 
be unable to select that gene in their children.  
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    A crucial argument against selection for non-medical traits including sex selection 
is that “social equality demands that each citizen be treated equally and has equal 
access to goods. There can be no social justice when enhancement procedures are 
not available to all citizens”.235 While this may be true for parents selecting 
enhancement characteristics it could be argued that by banning non-medical sex 
selection we are further restricting those who can afford to use PGD and sex 
selection. At the moment those who want to select the sex of their baby and can 
afford to do so have the possibility to travel abroad. If sex selection for family 
balancing were to become legal then it may result in opening up opportunities for 
those who want to select the sex of their baby but could not necessarily afford to 
travel abroad to do so. While allowing sex selection for family balancing in the UK 
would not give everyone equal access to the technology it  may not have the same 
effects as allowing genetic enhancement technology because there would be no 
selection for characteristics such as intelligence which would give the wealthy a 
bigger advantage. Those who could afford sex selection for family balancing would 
be able to exercise their reproductive autonomy and select the sex of their baby 
unless the NHS decides to fund the treatment which would seem unlikely.  
     
 
Who Pays? 
    Prior to allowing sex selection for family balancing to become legal within the UK, 
it must be decided who will pay for couples to select the sex of their baby. There are 
two options. On the one hand the NHS could pay and on the other couples, 
themselves, could pay. 
    “The NHS is funded by the central government, but it is divided into local units, 
called Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), each of which has substantial control over the 
spending of resources”.236 The NHS is financed out of general taxation and so 
should be available for patient without any extra costs but while there is no “blanket 
ban” on excluding a medical procedure from funding not all areas of health care are 
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equally funded. PCT’s in different areas may decide to fund different treatments.237 
The result is known as the “postcode lottery” which describes “seemingly random 
countrywide variations in the provision and quality of public services”.238 In 1999, 
NICE was established in an attempt to put an end to unequal access to treatments in 
different localities. NICE seeks to establish clinical and cost effectiveness of 
treatments.239 Despite the establishment of NICE patients still receive different types 
of treatments in different areas as PCTs are under no obligation to follow NICE 
guidelines and each PCT makes different decisions about how healthcare should be 
distributed. 
    Paying for sex selection could be contrasted with how IVF is paid for. According to 
NICE guidelines on IVF, it is stated that 
 
     “in women aged under 40 years who have not conceived after 2 years of regular  
      unprotected intercourse or 12 cycles of artificial insemination (where 6 or more  
      are by intrauterine insemination), offer 3 full cycles of IVF, with or without ICSI. If  
      the woman reaches the age of 40 during treatment, complete the current full  
      cycle but do not offer further full cycles”.240  
 
For women aged 40-42 the guidelines are different. If a women between 40 and 42 
has not conceived after two years of regular unprotected intercourse that 1 full cycle 
should be offered with or without  ICSI, provided the following 3 conditions are met: 
• they have never previously had IVF treatment 
• there is no evidence of low ovarian reserve (see recommendation 1.3.3.2) 
• there has been a discussion of the additional implications of IVF and 
pregnancy at this age.241 
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If a woman under the age of 40 has had IVF treatment before, no matter whether it 
was funded by the NHS or privately it should count towards the total of 3 full cycles 
offered by the NHS.242 As can be seen these recommendations are strict and the 
PCT’s are under no obligation to follow them exactly. Even though the NHS covers 
fertility treatments many couples do end up having to go private and the assumed 
consequence is that access to fertility treatment is dependent on wealth and not the 
NHS.243  
    Funding non-medical sex selection can also be contrasted with how PGD for 
medical reasons is funded within the UK. According to Guy’s and St Thomas’ Centre 
for Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis the cost of sex selection through PGD per 
cycle is approximately £8,000 plus drug costs which is approximately £1,000 - 
£1,200.244 The website states that once the centre knows whether a couple is eligible 
for PGD they apply to the couple’s local PCT for funding.245 The PCT will take into 
account the couple’s circumstances, for example, the woman’s age or the success 
rate of providing the treatment. If they decide they will not provide the funding then it 
is down to the couple whether or not to pay for the treatment themselves. As with 
IVF, the funding for PGD could depend on whether the couple can financially afford 
to pay for the treatment themselves. 
    In September 2012, the Telegraph published an article about the number of 
patients going private for their healthcare needs.246 The article found that a poll 
carried out by ComRes for the firm BMI Healthcare, discovered that 70 per cent of 
GPs are unable to refer patients for treatment on the NHS at least once a month as 
the patient does not qualify under the criteria issued by the local PCT.247 Rationing is 
a vital aspect of any healthcare system and decisions about who receives what 
treatment is taken 24 hours a day and to some may seem unfair. “Rationing is said 
to occur when there is only a limited resource of health care and the decision is 
made to offer it to some people, but not others”.248 In determining the cost-
effectiveness of treatments, NICE uses the concept of Quality Adjusted Life Years 
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(QALY). The QALY is a unit used to measure the cost-effectiveness of different 
treatments for the same condition or across treatments for different conditions. The 
QALY’s system has two parts to it. Firstly, there is the length of life – months or 
years- that the patient can expect following treatment and secondly, there is the 
quality of life. The quality is measured on a scale ranging from 0(death) to 1(perfect 
health) and takes into account the mobility, pain and discomfort, anxiety or 
depression and the ability to pursue usual activities in daily life.249 The final part is to 
work out the cost. “A treatment which offered a large number of QALY for a small 
amount of money would be highly cost effective, while one that produced a low 
number of QALY for a large amount of money would not be”.250 It is argued that it 
would be difficult to assess whether a person should be given non-medical sex 
selection on the NHS through the QALY system as non-medical sex selection has 
nothing to do with a person or future person. This could be seen as a major problem 
when deciding who should fund non-medical sex selection. While the NHS does fund 
IVF and PGD for medical reasons there are strict requirements which couples do 
have to meet and the aim is to fix a medical problem. People have IVF because they 
cannot have children naturally and so medicine and the NHS steps in to help. With 
PGD and medical reasons there is a risk that a child will be born with a potential life-
threatening illness and again medicine and the NHS steps in to help. But even the 
NHS cannot guarantee funding all requests for IVF and PGD which leaves couples 
with the three options. The first option is for the couple to go private and pay for the 
treatment themselves. The second is to continue to try naturally for a child and in 
some cases hope the resulting child is not affected by a genetic disease and the 
third is to not have any children. 
    If any non-medical sex selection were to become legal within the UK then 
unfortunately it does not seem justified to allow the NHS to fund the treatment. This 
is because the reasoning behind the treatment is not medical but just parental 
preference. It is not because they cannot have any children but because they wish to 
have a child of a certain sex. The NHS resources are not unlimited and unfortunately 
harsh decisions do have to be made regarding who receives what treatment. Access 
to certain treatments have already been restricted by raising the threshold of how ill 
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or disabled a patient has to be before they can receive treatment. It is argued that 
The NHS is already struggling without adding to its burdens and so if non-medical 
sex selection was to become legal within the UK it should not be funded by the NHS. 
In a perfect world everyone would have the same access to the same treatments but 
regrettably that is not possible and it could not be justified allowing a couple to 
receive sex selection for family balancing on the NHS but not a pensioner who needs 
their cataracts’ removed. If couples could afford to select the sex of their baby then 
the issue which arises is what happen if parents disagree over the sex they want or 
what to do with spare embryos? 
 
Parents Who Disagree Over the Sex 
    If sex selection for non-medical reasons were to become legal within the UK then 
certain dilemmas may arise where parents disagree over what to do with the spare 
embryos. I argue that only sex selection for family balancing should become legal 
within the UK and because of this it is not possible for parents to disagree over the 
sex of the child they wish to have. This is because with family balancing parents will 
be required to select the sex of the child which is opposite to any existing children 
they already have. However, the situation may arise where parents are in 
disagreement over what to do with any spare embryos, which may cause the 
problem of who decides what should happen to them. There are various options 
open to couples of what to do with the spare embryos. Firstly, embryos could be 
donated to research. Secondly, embryos could be frozen but there is a time limit on 
this. Thirdly, embryos could be destroyed or donated to infertile couples. If parents 
do disagree over what is to happen to the spare embryos then the question becomes 
who gets to decide? In order to answer this we need to look towards the case of 
Evans v the United Kingdom. 
    In this case Evans was diagnosed with having a serious pre-cancerous condition 
of the ovaries. Prior to treatment Evans had some of her eggs removed which were 
then fertilised with her partner’s J’s sperm and frozen. Both Evans and J were 
informed that either could withdraw their consent up until the time that the fertilised 
64 
 
eggs were implanted into Evans. Unfortunately the relationship broke down and J 
withdrew his consent for the embryos to be kept frozen.251  It was stated that:  
 
    “Respect for human dignity and free will, as well as a desire to ensure a fair  
     balance between the parties to IVF treatment, had underlain the legislature's  
     decision to enact provisions permitting of no exception, to ensure that every  
     person donating gametes for the purpose of IVF treatment would know in  
     advance that no use could be made of his or her genetic material without his or       
     her continuing consent. The absolute nature of the rule also served to promote  
     legal certainty and to avoid the problems of arbitrariness and inconsistency  
     inherent in weighing, on a case-by-case basis, “entirely incommensurable”  
     interests”.252  
 
It was also stated that “it was not appropriate for the applicant's right to respect for 
the decision to become a parent in the genetic sense to be accorded greater weight 
than J's right to respect for his decision not to have a genetically related child with 
her”.253 The result of this case was that the frozen embryos had to be destroyed and 
Evans lost her last chance to have a biological child.  This implies that if a couple 
disagreed over what happens over spare embryos or embryos of the opposite sex to 
which they desire then based upon this case the embryos would have to be 
destroyed. This is because the principle of consent is paramount and prior to 
treatment both people are informed that embryos will only be kept as long as their 
consent is valid. 
  
Conclusion 
    It is argued that despite the potential economic and social issues, sex selection for 
family balancing should become legal within the UK. Couples who want to use sex 
selection technology do so because of family balancing reasons, as evidenced by 
the Trathens’ and Gunns’ cases. It is assumed that those who can afford to, travel 
abroad to countries where sex selection technology is legal often combining it with a 
holiday. Allowing sex selection for family balancing to be legal within the UK may 
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allow fairer access to the technology by cutting cost as they will not have to travel 
abroad. Even though couples may have to fund the treatment privately they will not 
have to find the money to travel abroad also. Unfortunately, the NHS does not have 
unlimited resources and tough decisions do have to be made about who should 
receive treatment. Parents who want to select the sex of their children for family 
balancing reasons do not have a medical condition. It is a personal preference and 
therefore the NHS resources will be used to help people who have medical 
conditions before those who want to have access to technology for sex selection for 
non-medical reasons. It is argued that there is a fear that sex selection for family 
balancing will be the beginning of the slippery slope towards designer babies and 
consequently a gap will begin to form between the wealthy and the poor. This will not 
be so as parents will not be able to select for characteristics such as intelligence or 
sporting ability. It is argued that while there will be a gap between those who can 
afford the technology and those who cannot, it will give low-earning couples a better 
chance of funding the treatment if it was allowed in the UK than if sex selection for 
family balancing was illegal. Parents will not be able to disagree over which sex they 
want their child to be because with sex selection for family balancing, couples can 
only select the sex which is opposite to that which they already have. So far, this 
dissertation has shown that there are no ethical or social economic issues standing 
in the way of sex selection for family balancing becoming legal within the UK. 
However, are there any legal barriers preventing sex selection for family balancing 
becoming legal 
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Chapter Three 
A Legal Analysis  
 
    With sex selection technologies evolving and becoming more available regulation 
is essential. However, regulation of sex selection and reproductive technologies are 
far from straight forward. The UK is a multi-cultural society with ranging views and 
opinions on sex selection making regulation difficult. Society is composed of a 
variety of people with a variety of beliefs and the law attempts to reflect the common 
moral position of all these beliefs. It attempts to provide a framework of what is 
morally acceptable and unacceptable in society. 254 However, finding a common 
moral position within society on sex selection will be near non-existent. This leaves 
the problem of how to regulate sex selection. This section aims to analyse the legal 
principles involved in sex selection and to find the best position the UK can take 
which takes into account both sides of the argument. 
 
The current law in the UK 
    The law on assisted reproduction and sex selection is heavily regulated in the UK 
through the HFE Act. The HFE Act was passed in response to the recommendations 
of the Warnock Report 1984.255  The Warnock Report 1984 was a response to the 
speed at which reproductive technologies were advancing and also to the birth of 
Louise Brown in 1978.256 “The committee concluded that the human embryo should 
be protected but that research on embryos and IVF would be permissible, given 
appropriate safeguards”.257 It was proposed by the committee that a regulatory 
committee should be set up to license the treatment, storage and research of human 
embryos.258 This regulatory committee was to be the HFEA and in many ways the 
report formed the basis of the HFE Act.259 Consequently, the area of assisted 
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reproduction and sex selection became regulated through the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (HFE Act) 1990 as amended in 2008.  
    The Act divides reproductive treatments into three categories. Firstly, there are 
those treatments which are illegal, for example, it is unlawful to place a non-human 
embryo in a woman (s 3(2)).260  Secondly, there are those treatments that are illegal 
unless performed by a licensed clinic, for example, the storage of an embryo is only 
legal if carried out by a license (s 3(1A))261. Thirdly, there are treatments which are 
not covered by the Act and can legally be carried out without a license, for example, 
“do it yourself insemination” using fresh sperm and a turkey baster.262 Sex selection 
falls within category two – it is illegal unless the clinic is licensed to perform sex 
selection by the HFEA. If a clinic performed any type of sex selection whether 
medical or non-medical without a license from the HFEA then it would be acting 
illegally. If sex selection for family balancing were to become legal within the UK, the 
HFEA would act as the relevant regulatory body to ensure the implementation of the 
new law.   
 
The role of the HFEA and Sex Selection 
    The HFEA was created by section 5 of the HFE Act 1990 and is an executive non-
departmental public body sponsored by the department of health and began 
operating on the 1st August 1991.263 The role of the HFEA is to investigate all clinics 
in the UK whether private or public which offer reproductive services.264 This ensures 
that no clinic can carry out unlicensed activities, such as sex selection for family 
balancing, without the HFEA knowing of it.  
   Despite non-medical sex selection being illegal in the UK, the HFEA does not have 
the power to punish UK clinics for recommending to couples clinics abroad which 
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offer sex selection technologies without legal restriction.265 A clinic could legally carry 
out assessment, drug therapy in preparation for IVF and even egg retrieval, as long 
as licensed clinic handles embryology and embryo replacement. This is known as 
‘Transport IVF’ and could help clients reduce the cost of overseas treatment.266 PGD 
is expensive so if part of the treatment could be performed in the UK it could act as 
an incentive to parents to use PGD for sex selection in the UK instead of travelling 
abroad because it will be cheaper. From the view of medical ethics, non-medical sex 
selection allows a healthy woman with no fertility problems to undergo the pain, 
expense and danger of egg collection and embryo transfer for the sole purpose of 
complying with parental desire.267 However, if a woman is willing to undergo the 
great physical, emotional and financial burden of having a child of a certain sex for 
family balancing reasons, then why should she be prevented from doing so? 
     A scenario could arise where an NHS doctor could recommend a potentially 
harmful though extremely lucrative procedure which has no medical benefit for either 
the mother or the child which he has a financial interest in.268  Lord David Alton, a 
cross-bench peer and a member of the ali-party Parliamentary Pro-Life group has 
argued that “if you have a doctor with a vested interest in organising treatment that’s 
illegal in the UK, that raises enormous moral issues”, he further argued that “its 
deplorable that there are these ways to circumvent the law in Britain”.269  It is argued 
that this is where the law on sex selection fails magnificently. It does not allow sex 
selection for non-medical reasons to be legal within the UK but neither can it prevent 
doctors helping couples to travel abroad to select the sex of their child or from 
couples acting on their own accord. It is suggested that the law on sex selection is 
ineffective with no consequences for those disregarding the law and travelling 
abroad to select the sex of their children.  However, unlike international surrogacy 
where parents can run into problems with obtaining passports in order to bring the 
children home, it would be extremely difficult to prove that a woman has become 
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pregnant through IVF and PGD abroad, which is illegal in their own country.270 One 
might argue that if couples can access these sex selective technologies abroad then 
why not just allow sex selection for non-medical reasons to become legal in the UK 
where there is a properly regulated healthcare system which also reduces the cost, 
inconvenience and risk of treatment abroad.271 However, while the reproductive 
tourism argument is persuasive, it is ultimately not the decisive factor in determining 
whether sex selection for family balancing should become legal within the UK. This is 
because the ban on sex selection for non-medical reasons may be partially effective 
as some couples may be discouraged from travelling abroad to seek sex selective 
treatment.272   
    When the HFEA was created reproductive technology was still quite new and 
controversial. The existence of the HFEA has allowed reproductive technology to 
advance with credibility and has reassured the public that scientists are not creating 
‘Frankenstein’s children’.273 Despite the credibility that the HFEA has given the 
advancement of reproductive technology it has recently been announced that the 
government plans to abolish the HFEA and to give their powers and responsibilities 
to other institutions mainly the Care Quality Commission.274  
 
Code of Practice 
    An important activity of the HFEA is that it publishes a Code of Practice which all 
licensed clinics must comply with. The Code of Practice “allows the HFEA to monitor 
and control the practices which take place in all clinics”.275 The advantage of the 
HFEA in publishing a Code of Practice in which to regulate assisted reproduction is 
that it can respond quickly to advancing technology unlike legislation passed by 
Parliament which can take a while. In the original HFE Act 1990 sex selection was 
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not mentioned which resulted in the HFEA regulating this area through Codes of 
Practices prior to the 2008 amendments. Sex Selection is now codified at Section 3 
of Schedule 2 of the 2008 Act which reaffirms that sex selection is only legal where 
there is a risk that any resulting child will suffer from a serious, sex-linked disorder. 
When sex selection is performed it must be ascertained that the illness affects only 
one sex or disproportionately affects one sex.276 This section effectively prevents 
couples from exercising their reproductive freedom and selecting the sex of their 
children for non-medical reasons. It is argued that parents who want access to this 
technology do so for family balancing reasons in order to have the experience of 
raising children of both sexes. However, should the law evolve and allow sex 
selection to become legal for family balancing? To answer this question, the HFEA 
has carried out consultations. 
 
Consultations 
    Over the years there have been various consultations produced on the debate of 
sex selection for non-medical reasons. In 2002 the HFEA was asked by the Minister 
for Public Health to conduct a review of sex selective techniques, including their 
safety, reliability and arrangements for their regulation.277 The report was entitled 
“Sex Selection: Options for Regulation”. The purpose of the consultation was to 
provide the UK government with a report detailing opinions of sex selection and how 
it should be regulated in the UK. It would include an analysis of whether legislation is 
truly benefiting patients and how sex selection should be regulated which protects 
the interests of patients, the public and the welfare of any future child born as a 
result.278  
    The consultation concluded that sex selection was only legal for medical reasons. 
On the day of the release of their recommendations the HFEA’s press release 
stated: 
 
     “The HFEA has to balance the potential benefit of any technique against potential     
      harm. We are not persuaded that the likely benefits of permitting sex selection for  
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    social reasons are strong enough to outweigh the potential harm that might be  
    done”.279  
 
From the responses of the participants, the HFEA felt that there was a concern for 
non-medical sex selection and the deterioration of moral standards within society 
and even those who had no feeling on a personal level in regard to sex selection felt 
that by allowing a large number of individuals to choose the sex of their children 
would result in a sewing of the sex ratio and would reinforce discriminatory 
attitudes.280 However, as chapter one has argued these consequences will probably 
not occur if sex selection for family balancing become legal. It is argued that parents 
should not have unfettered control over the sex of all their children. Before parents 
can select the sex of their child using PGD they would have to have at least two or 
three existing children all of the same sex and they would be required to select the 
sex which is opposite to the sex of their existing children. If there was a change in 
the sex ratio then certain conditions could be put into place, for example pairing 
couples who wanted a girl with couples who wanted a boy, to ensure that the sex 
ratio remained constant. Sex selection for family balancing should not enhance sex 
discrimination because it is believed that most parents want to have children of both 
sexes in order to experience the differences in rearing a girl to a boy. Experiments, 
such as the Jack-in-the-box experiment, have shown that there are biological 
differences between girls and boys such as different patterns of aggression, learning, 
and spatial recognition, as well as hormonal differences.  There are other potential 
consequences of sex selection for family balancing such as the slippery slope to 
designer babies or the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. Many 
believe that sex selection is the beginning of designer babies but it is argued that it is 
not the case as when parents select the sex of their children through PGD, they are 
only selecting which embryos should be implanted based upon their sex. They are 
not designing their children. Sex selection for family balancing should not be illegal 
for fear of what is possible in the future. If the possibility of designer babies does 
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become a reality in the future, then it will be regulated accordingly then. As sex 
selection for family balancing should not be funded by the NHS, it would have to be 
funded privately thus limiting who will have access to this technology. It is argued 
that it will only be the rich who will be able to afford sex selection for family balancing 
but this should not prevent it becoming legal. There are various treatments, such as 
cosmetic surgery, which are only available privately and these are not illegal 
because they are essentially only available to the rich. It is suggested that these 
potential consequences of sex selection for family balancing do not outweigh the 
potential benefits for those parents who want to select the sex of their children for 
family balancing reasons.  
    In its report the HFEA made clear that an important part of the consultation was 
consulting with public opinion. A survey was conducted by MORI (Market and 
Opinion Research International) of 2615 UK citizens and more than 80% of 
respondents did not want sperm sorting or PGD to be made available for non-
medical reasons.281 It must be remembered that the HFEA conducted a consultation 
and not a survey. A survey is representative of the population as a whole and a 
consultation is not about matching the views of the population in proportion to who 
thinks what. It is argued that the HFEA should perform another consultation in order 
to ascertain the publics’ feelings towards sex selection for non-medical reasons. In 
the 2002-2003 consultation it was stated that “But there would need to be substantial 
demonstrable benefits of such a policy if the State were to challenge the public 
consensus on this issue”.282 While it is important to consult with the public on public 
policy matters such as the legality of sex selection for non-medical reasons, it must 
be remembered that reproductive autonomy is a fundamental right which can only be 
limited for very good reason. It is argued that there should be a presumption in 
favour of reproductive liberty. It should be for those opposing sex selection for non-
medical reasons to show that there is a risk to either citizens or society. As has been 
argued parents who want access to sex selection technology do so because they 
wish to have children of both sexes. However, a major concern of the consultation 
which should be addressed before sex selection for family balancing can become 
legal within the UK is the welfare of the child requirement. 
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Welfare of the Child 
    When considering parents for the use of fertility treatment, clinics must take into 
account the welfare of any child born as well as any existing children as a result of 
the treatment (s13(5)HFE Act 1990). This is not a new idea as the notion of taking 
into account the welfare of the child preceded the HFE Act and Codes of Practices, 
for example, in The Children Act 1989, section 1(3).283  
    Section 13(5) does not specify how a clinic should approach the welfare of the 
child condition. However, support does come from the HFEA’s code of practice. 
Section 8.10 is crucial as it gives guidance on which factors should be taken into 
account when dealing with the welfare of the child requirement. These factors 
include past or current circumstances that may lead to any child experiencing 
serious physical or psychological harm or neglect, past or current circumstances that 
are likely to lead to an inability to care throughout childhood for any child who may 
be born, or that are seriously impairing the care of any existing child of the family.284 
Section 8.15 gives guidance on when a centre should refuse treatment, for example, 
where they conclude that any child who may be born or any existing child of the 
family is likely to be at risk of significant harm or when the centre cannot obtain 
enough information to conclude that there is no significant risk.285 Despite the 
guidance which has been issued by the HFEA over the years, the welfare of the child 
requirement is not a straightforward procedure. While clinics can be reasonably 
reassured that any child born will not suffer from physical harm, psychological harm 
is another issue. It cannot easily be assessed. The 2002-2003 consultation focused 
on the welfare of the child requirement for non-medical sex selection. The HFEA 
weighed a number of factors in regard to the welfare of the child, for example, the 
psychological harm if a child does find out that they have been sex selected, the 
possibility of preferential or prejudicial treatment to fit parental expectations, or the 
potential of favouritism and neglect of existing children.286  It is suggested that the 
problem with these risks is that they are theoretical and hard to prove and that 
without data on the impact of sex selection upon the sex selected child these risks 
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and benefits remain speculative.287 The “HFEA produces no evidence, nor indeed 
could it produce any evidence that children would be selected for their sex alone”.288 
As has been argued parents who want access to sex selective technology do so, not 
because of sex alone or because they believe that one sex is superior to the other 
but because they want to be able to experience the rearing of children of both sexes.  
If sex selection just for family balancing were to become legal then it could 
significantly reduce the risk of psychological harm and may even enhance the 
parent-child relationship. This may be because parents would not have the 
emotional, physical and psychological pressure to continue to ‘try’ for a child of a 
certain sex naturally nor would the child feel unwanted or unloved because they 
were of the ‘wrong’ sex.  Importantly, parents may not inform their existing children 
or future child that they used sex selective technology to ensure that they had a child 
of a certain sex and thus it may reduce the psychological harm as all the children 
would believe that they have been created in the same way. Further, one of the 
requirements is that clinics are sure that any child will be born into a stable and 
supportive environment.289 This would imply that if parents want to use sex selection 
techniques for family balancing and did have very unusual motivations, such as 
believing that one sex is superior to the other, then there would be reasonable 
grounds for the clinic to ask hard questions and possibly even to deny them 
treatment.290 
    Some would argue why should there be the welfare of the child requirement. We 
do not interview and test parents who have children naturally. So why is children 
born through reproductive technologies any different?  The answer is that couples 
presenting for PGD can have ulterior motives, especially for non-medical reasons but 
this does not present a strong enough justification for banning all non-medical sex 
selection. The HFEA has already produced significant requirements to ensure the 
welfare of any child born as a result of reproductive technologies which goes a long 
way to ensure that sex selection for non-medical reasons would be dealt with 
appropriately.291 It is understandable that the HFEA wants to take a cautious 
approach in this area but it is suggested that to ban something because of potential 
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risks which could arise when parents have children naturally is going too far. It is 
argued that allowing sex selection for family balancing is a cautious approach and it 
reduces the risk that children would not suffer from psychological harm and the 
HFEA could provide strict regulation and guidance through their code of practice.  
    Based upon the non-identity principle it would be ethically acceptable to allow 
parents to choose the sex of their child without regard for the welfare of that child 
because any life is surely better than non-existence. However, it is argued that this is 
not legally acceptable and for most would not be morally acceptable.  It is suggested 
that if sex selection for family balancing did become legal within the UK, a solution 
needs to be found which would take into account both the parents’ reproductive 
autonomy and the welfare of the child and any existing children. 
    A critical part of section 15(3) wording is that ‘account has been taken of the 
welfare of the child’. This implies that even though the welfare of the child 
requirement is an important consideration in assisted reproduction, it is not the 
overriding consideration. Other factors, such as parents’ reproductive freedom, can 
be taken into account and given the same or even more importance than the welfare 
of the child requirement. As has been argued in chapter 1 at page 14 reproductive 
freedom is a prima facie right that cannot be limited except for very good reason. If 
there was a risk that that the child born from assisted reproductive technology or any 
existing children would be in danger or harmed than parents’ reproductive freedom 
should be limited. However, it is argued that if parents want to exercise their 
reproductive freedom to have a child of a certain sex for family balancing reasons, 
such as experiencing the rearing of both sexes, then as long as there is no physical 
or psychological risk to the future child or of any existing children then their 
reproductive autonomy should prevail. 
 
European and International Law on Sex Selection 
    The Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 gives effect to all the rights contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The most relevant and important 
article relating to sex selection for family balancing is that of Article 8. Article 8(1) of 
the ECHR protects a person’s right to a private family life.  
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  The case of S.H. And Others v Austria292 states that the right of a couple to 
conceive a child and to make use of medically assisted procreation for that end 
comes within the ambit of Article 8, as such a choice is clearly an expression of 
private and family life.293 This indicates that procreation including any natural or 
assisted reproduction comes within the remit of Article 8(1).  
    However, Article 8(1) must be read in conjunction with Article 8(2) which states 
that: 
 
     “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right  
      except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic  
      society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well- 
      being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of  
      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.294  
 
This provision allows the State to legally interfere in a person’s private life but only 
for the legitimate reasons stated above. Article 8(2) would be used to legally allow 
the UK to ban sex selection for family balancing. There are no reported cases of sex 
selection and Article 8 but there are cases where the facts are different but the 
principles that have been discussed can be used to ascertain the remit of Article 8 
and more importantly Article 8(2). 
 
“Necessary in a Democratic Society 
    In the case of Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1)295 the court established that the notion of 
necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in 
particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining 
whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Court will take 
into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States.296 This is 
supported by the case of Campbell v MGN297 where it was emphasised that the 
phrase “necessary in a democratic society” contained in Article 8(2) means not just 
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convenient or reasonable but that there is a pressing social requirement.298  The 
case of K and T v Finland299, stated that “in determining whether the impugned 
measures were “necessary in a democratic society” the Court will consider whether, 
in light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify them were relevant 
and sufficient for the purpose of Article 8 of the Convention.”300  
    This dissertation has shown that the banning of sex selection for family balancing 
is not necessary for moral or ethical reasons. Most UK couples would like access to 
sex selective technology for family balancing reasons and to experience the rearing 
of children of both sexes.  Studies, such as the-jack-in-the-box experiment, have 
shown that there does exist a biological difference between the sexes. This 
reinforces the argument that sex selection for family balancing would not be 
discriminatory. It is suggested that banning sex selection would be necessary if it 
altered the sex ratio of the UK. However, there is no evidence that this would happen 
in the UK, as sex selection would only become legal for family balancing reasons 
and parents would only be able to choose the sex which is opposite to the sex they 
already have and it is generally thought that UK parents value both girls and boys 
equally. If there were concerns about sex selection for family balancing altering the 
sex ratio then certain conditions, such as pairing couples who wanted a girl with 
those couples who wanted a boy, could be put in place to ensure that the ratio 
stayed constant. There are concerns that sex selection for family balancing may be 
the beginning of the slippery slope towards designer babies or that it may widen the 
gap between the rich and the poor because only the rich would be able to afford it.  It 
is argued that while these are crucial arguments they are not strong enough to justify 
the state’s necessary interference. At the moment, designer babies are not possible 
and sex selection for family balancing should not be banned because there is the 
chance that designer babies may or may not become a reality in the future. It is 
suggested that sex selection for family balancing should be funded privately and thus 
would only be available to those who can afford it and consequently it is not enough 
to prevent sex selection for family balancing becoming legal because many 
treatments, such as cosmetic surgery for non-medical reasons, are privately funded 
and thus only available to the wealthy. It is argued that the state banning all non-
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medical sex selection is not necessary in the UK and there is no pressing social 
requirement which justifies interference. Based upon the UK’s society and culture, 
banning all non-medical sex selection is not a proportionate response, it is not in the 
public’s best interest and it does not balance all the competing interests. 
 
Proportionality 
    Article 8(2) states that any interference by the state into a person’s private life 
must be proportionate. This is shown in the case of Z v Finland301 where a husband 
was being prosecuted and the police used his wife’s medical records to determine 
when he became HIV positive. The wife complained to the European Court of 
Human Rights that her human rights had been breached. She was unsuccessful. 
“The court indicated that the more intimate the information the stronger the 
countervailing interests had to be to justify revealing it”.302  This principle is further 
supported by the case of Olsson v. Sweden (No. 1). This raises the question of 
whether banning all non-medical sex selection in the UK is acting proportionately?  
The answer to this is twofold. On the one hand it could be seen that the UK is acting 
proportionately as they have not banned all sex selection. Sex selection for medical 
reasons is legal. On the other hand, it could be seen that it is a disproportionate 
response to the case of sex selection for non-medical reasons. It is proposed that 
most would agree that sex selection for medical reasons is ethical but sex selection 
for non-medical reasons is contentious. There are many worthy arguments both for 
and against sex selection for family balancing. “However, should the position not be 
that absent a convincing case to the contrary those who wish to use sex selective 
technology should be at liberty to do so, even if they wish to use them in unusual or 
unpopular ways?”303 This is not the case with the UK. It is for those wishing to use 
sex selective technology to convince others to share, or even empathise with, those 
values and priorities.304 This goes against the supremacy of the theory of 
reproductive freedom which should only be limited for very good reasons. 
    The legal approach taken by the UK is to ban all sex selection for non-medical 
reasons which can be seen as not only being disproportionate but it also goes 
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against the ethical theory of reproductive autonomy. A more proportionate and 
ethical response could be to only allow sex selection for family balancing to be legal. 
This would allow parents some reproductive choice over the sex of their children as 
well as allowing them the opportunity to experience the rearing of children of both 
sexes if that is what they wish and it would also prevent parents from having children 
of a certain sex because of ulterior motives, such as wishing to have all boys 
because boys are superior.  Also, it could prevent the UK from going down the 
slippery slope towards designer babies. 
 
The Public Interest  
    Sex selection for non-medical reasons could legitimately be banned if it is in the 
publics’ best interest. However, whose best interests are we suppose to be 
protecting? This is best illustrated through the disability debate. There are two main 
perceptions of disability. There is the “medical model” and the “social model”. The 
medical model is supported by John Harris who defines disability as “a physical or 
mental condition which we have strong preference not to be in”.305 Harris prefers to 
call this the medical model, “the harmed condition”.  The social model is defended by 
Tom Shakespeare and distinguishes between an impairment as a medical condition 
of the body, and disability, as a social prejudice and discrimination. Whether an 
impairment will lead to a disability is dependent upon the nature of the social 
environment that the individual lives in. 306 The difference between the two can be 
best illustrated by the deafness and disability debate. Deafness under the medical 
model would be classed as a disability but under the social model deafness would be 
classed as a cultural group who form a linguistic minority, not people with a disability. 
For them, deafness is viewed as culture which should be celebrated and conserved 
and one that is not understood by the hearing world.307 This has been a contentious 
debate, especially in the US, where a lesbian couple who were deaf themselves, 
wanted to have a baby who would also be deaf. In 2002, deaf couple Sharon 
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Duschesneau and Candice McCullough wanted to have a baby which was also deaf. 
The couple approached their deaf friend who had five generations of deafness in his 
family to be the biological father of their child through sperm donation and IVF.  The 
chances that the potential baby would be born deaf was 50%. At three months their 
baby was diagnosed with being partially deaf and that without the early use of a 
hearing amplification they would have speech impediment. The couple decided not 
to fit their baby with the hearing device and argued that it was not their choice to 
make but their sons.308 This case implies that people who are afflicted with deafness 
do not see themselves as having a disability. They view deafness as a “culture that 
should be celebrated and conserved,” which is not understood by the hearing 
community.309 It could be seen that deaf couples seeking to select for a deaf child 
draw attention to their right to reproductive autonomy rather than to the quality of life 
of a deaf person, arguing that those in the wider community should respect their 
decision and the reproductive choices they choose to make. However, there is a 
widely held view that the right to reproductive autonomy is limited and does not 
extend to choosing to create a child whose life will be more difficult or have fewer 
options than would otherwise have been possible.310  A person need not be deaf to 
participate in the deaf community – many people learn more than one language and 
can move between languages easily. A hearing child could learn sign language and 
could participate in both the hearing and deaf community.311 Preventing deaf parents 
from being able to select a deaf child may amount to discrimination because they 
want the same opportunity as hearing parents to have a child like themselves.312 The 
crucial point for this section is that the deaf community do not see themselves as 
having a disability rather it is how the rest of society views them. They want a child 
who will be able experience their culture and have the same experiences they have 
had. In this view, they do not see themselves as a minority that needs protecting. 
     A similar situation arises in the debate concerning sex selection for non-medical 
reasons.  A public interest which may need protecting with non-medical sex selection 
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is the affect non-medical sex selection has on people with gender dysphoria. It has 
already been discussed previously in this dissertation in chapter one, page 27, that 
parents who want a child of a certain sex may end up with a child who suffers from 
gender dysphoria. There is the assumption that gender is easily characterised and 
this is problematic for society as it may make people less tolerant of diversity. Those 
who do not meet the gender norms established by society, may suffer from feelings 
of self-worth, self confidence, psychological stability, bodily comfort, personal safety 
and personal relationships.313 By allowing non-medical sex selection there may be a 
risk that society will view sex as meaning the same as gender when this is untrue. 
Parents may want a girl and expect the girl to grow up and conform to stereotypes 
and gender roles. But this is not always the case. Sex selection for family balancing 
should not be banned solely on this basis. It is argued that while it is a vital issue 
with sex selection, banning all non-medical sex selection should be the last resort. 
This is shown in the case of Enhorn v Sweden314 and although it is a HIV case the 
judgement is relevant here. The court found that the compulsory isolation of the 
applicant was not a last resort in order to prevent him from spreading the HIV virus 
because less severe measures had not been considered and found to be insufficient 
to safeguard the public interest.315 While sex selection techniques may reinforce 
gender stereotypes and roles, it may be more appropriately combated through the 
views of society not regulation. Less severe measures should be tried and tested 
first. Banning all non-medical sex selection should be the last resort. It could be seen 
that sex selection for family balancing allows couples to exercise their reproductive 
rights while protecting society’s interests. Couples will be able to experience the 
rearing of children of both sexes if that is what they wish while not encouraging 
gender stereotypes and roles. It is argued that the welfare of the child requirement 
will play a crucial role in ensuring that children are not treated as commodities and 
that any sex selected child who is born with gender dysphoria or who does not 
conform to the conventional gender norms will be still be brought into a loving and 
stable environment. Couples who have unusual motivations for wanting to select the 
sex of their children can be refused treatment by the clinic. The welfare of the child 
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requirement is set at a high standard to ensure the protection of the couples wanting 
access to sex selection technology, the future child, any existing children of the 
family, the doctors performing the procedure and society in general. Society’s 
interest can still be protected without having to ban all sex selection for family 
balancing.  
 
Balancing Competing Interests 
    If the State relies on Article 8(2) to interfere in a person’s private life then there 
must be a balancing of competing interests in order for the interference to be legal. 
In the case of Dickson v The United Kingdom316 the Court considered that even if the 
applicants’ Article 8 complaint was before the Secretary of State and the Court of 
Appeal, the policy set the threshold so high against them from the outset that it did 
not allow a balancing of the competing individual and public interests and a 
proportionality test by the Secretary of State or by the domestic courts in their case, 
as required by the Convention.317 In the cases of  Odièvre v. France,318 Godelli v. 
Italy,319 and Evans v. the United-Kingdom it was conformed that a fair balance must 
be struck between the various competing interests. Case law implies that all interests 
in the sex selection debate must be balanced. In regard to sex selection this would 
involve balancing the parents’ right to reproductive freedom and to choose the sex of 
their children against the interests of society as a whole. Allowing sex selection for 
family balancing may be seen as the solution to balancing all the competing 
interests. It allows couples their reproductive freedom to choose the sex of their 
children as long as it is for family balancing reasons as well as preventing 
reproduction becoming commercialised by treating children as commodities. It is 
argued that banning all non-medical sex selection is not taking into account all the 
competing interests, all it does is support the view that all sex selection for non-
medical reasons is unethical and should be illegal. An interest which also needs to 
be taken into is the future embryo that will be born. According to the non-identity 
theory, the best interest for the embryo is to always be born otherwise they would 
never exist and this would only be a better option if their life was worse than death. 
In most cases this is not the case. The UK does not adopt this black and white 
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approach but it does consider the embryo’s interest through the welfare of the child 
requirement which holds that if the clinic believes that parents have unusual 
motivations for selecting the sex of their child they will be refused treatment. It is 
proposed that sex selection for family balancing provides a solution which takes into 
account all the competing interests and arguments and is a reasonable solution to 
the problem of sex selection in the UK. 
 
Protection of the rights and freedom of Others 
    Sex selection for non-medical reasons can be banned if it protects the rights and 
freedoms of others. At first light one thinks that allowing parents to choose the sex of 
their baby does not interfere with the rights and freedoms of others. Unfortunately, 
the answer is not that straight forward. Parents who choose the sex of their children 
affects the rights of the future child who will exist also. The European Commission of 
Human Rights has stated: 
 
     “For numerous Anglo-Saxon and French authors, the right to respect for 'private  
      life' is ... the right to live, as far as one wishes, protected from publicity ... the right  
     to respect for private life does not end there [but includes also the right to] ... the 
     development and fulfilment of one's own personality”.320  
 
The most relevant part of this definition for this section is “the development and 
fulfilment of one’s own personality”. Does allowing parents to choose the sex of their 
child prevent that child from developing their own personality? While sex is not 
indicative of personality the problem which might arise is that parents who select the 
sex of their children may have high expectations for them to behave in a certain way, 
for example girls are suppose to like pink and dresses where as boys are interested 
in playing in the mud and sports. If parents put these expectations onto their 
children, will they be pressurized into behaving this way and not develop their own 
personality. However, to a certain extent parent’s influence on their children at an 
early age can be reversed. So even if parents put pressure on their children to 
adhere to gender roles, when they start to mature they can start to make their own 
decisions and preferences. This should not prevent sex selection for family balancing 
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becoming legal as the same scenario could arise when parents have children 
naturally. Further, as has been discussed earlier in the chapter at page 72 the UK 
has extensive regulation to ensure the welfare of any child born though reproductive 
technology.  
   It could be argued that allowing parents to select the sex of their children interferes 
with an embryos right to life. Embryos will be created and destroyed because of their 
sex. (Whether embryos have a right to life will be discussed later in this chapter at 
page 90). As embryos are purposely created for research and for medical sex 
selection and thus interfering with embryos potential right to life before the 14 days is 
not a sufficient reason for banning sex selection for family balancing. 
 
Wide Margin of Appreciation 
    Case law has revealed that countries have a wide margin of appreciation over the 
regulation of assisted reproduction.  This is shown in the case of S.H and Others v. 
Austria where the Grand Chamber overturned the judgment of the Chamber and 
decided that the margin of appreciation to be given to Austria had to be a wide one, 
given that the use of in vitro fertilisation treatment gave rise to sensitive ethical 
issues against a background of fast-moving scientific developments. 321 
The Court also underlined that the field of artificial procreation, being subject to a 
particularly dynamic development in science and law, had to be kept under review by 
the member States. The case of Evans v. the United-Kingdom concluded that since 
the use of IVF treatment gives rise to sensitive moral and ethical issues against a 
background of fast-moving medical and scientific developments, and since the 
questions raised by the case touch on areas where there is no clear common ground 
amongst the Member States, the Court considers that the margin of appreciation to 
be afforded to the respondent State must be a wide one. 322 Both of these cases are 
further supported by Keegan v. Ireland323, Funke v France324 and Olsson v. Sweden 
(No. 1). 
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   The case law shows that as reproductive technology is an area where states have 
differing views, they are consequently left with a wide margin of appreciation on the 
regulation of assisted reproductive technology. Given that the UK has this wide 
margin of appreciation it is probable that they will not be challenged by EC law if they 
decided to make sex selection legal for family balancing or if they continue to ban all 
non-medical sex selection. 
    It has been shown that the reasons stated in Article 8(2) are not sufficient for 
banning sex selection for family balancing within the UK. The UK could legitimately 
allow sex selection for family balancing without conflicting with Article 8(2) and 
without being in conflict with international law. Article 14 of the Council of Europe 
Convention on Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the 
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(Oviedo Convention) states that “the use of techniques of medically assisted 
procreation shall not be allowed for the purpose of choosing a child’s sex except 
where serious hereditary sex related disease is to be avoided”.325 What is vital 
though is that the UK has not signed and ratified this convention. It is argued that 
banning all non-medical sex selection is not a proportionate response and neither 
does it balance the competing interests proportionately. It is proposed that sex 
selection for family balancing should become legal as it is a proportionate response 
to the debate and it balances parent’s right to reproductive freedom, the public’s 
interest and the interest of the future embryo. Reproduction whether natural or 
assisted is a private, family matter and should be treated as such. It should be for 
those opposing sex selection for non-medical reasons to show the adverse affects it 
will have on society. So far this dissertation has shown that allowing sex selection for 
family balancing will not have any adverse impacts for society. It can be seen to take 
into account all the competing interests and it is a proportionate and legitimate 
response to the sex selection debate. A further argument which may support the 
view that sex selection for family balancing should be legal within the UK is that it 
may be legally possible for a woman to obtain an abortion based on the fact the she 
is carrying a foetus which is of the wrong sex to which she wants. 
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Sex selection through Abortion  
    “The mainstream media regularly condemn sex selective abortion and use the 
language “gendercide” and calls for countries where sex selective abortion is most 
prevalent to do more about it”.326In February 2012, news broke out in the UK that 
doctors had been filmed offering to falsify paperwork in order that a woman could 
have an abortion because the foetus which she is carrying is of the wrong sex.327 
While sex selection through PGD for non-medical reasons is illegal in the UK, the 
question becomes whether sex selection through abortion is illegal. 
    Section 58 of the Offences against the Person Act 1961 makes obtaining an 
abortion in the UK illegal. However, the Abortion Act 1967 makes a defence to the 
illegality of abortion. Section 1 of the Act describes the four grounds for which a 
woman could have an abortion. For the purposes of this discussion, there is only one 
ground which is relevant. This ground is sometimes referred to as the “social ground” 
and states that “the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were 
terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any 
existing children of the family”.328  If a woman wanted to obtain an abortion based 
upon the sex of the foetus for non-medical reasons then she would have to rely on 
this ground. Section 1 of the Act also states that for a termination of a pregnancy to 
be legally performed two medical practitioners, are of the opinion in good faith that 
one of the grounds contained in the Act apply. Also, “the doctor can take into 
account the pregnant woman’s actual or reasonably foreseeable environment, 
including her social and economic circumstances in coming to this decision 
(s1(2))”.329 
    While, sex selection for non-medical reasons is not an official ground for 
termination of a pregnancy, in certain circumstances it can be argued that a 
termination of a pregnancy based on the gender of the foetus is lawful.330 “We may 
find gender related abortions morally repugnant but this does not mean that a 
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gender-related abortion cannot ‘fit’ within the grounds for abortion permitted under 
the Abortion Act 1967”.331 
    If a woman wanted an abortion because of the sex of the foetus she would have to 
prove that having a child of a certain sex would affect her emotional or mental health. 
If a woman is forced to continue with a pregnancy of a foetus which is of the ‘wrong 
gender’ and who is fearful of the consequences for herself, her unborn child or her 
existing children then she may be far removed from a state of mental and social well-
being, even if the underlying reasons may be felt to be unacceptable.332 We may find 
this immoral but is it fair to force a woman to continue with a pregnancy which will 
impact greatly on her life and which she does not want? A woman may request an 
abortion because it interferes with her career or she wants to go travelling - why are 
these reasons any different from women who want a boy after three girls?  
    Williams makes an excellent defence of sex-selective abortion. He begins his 
argument by considering the following women: 
1. “Jane has been raped. She cannot cope with the emotional costs involved in 
carrying in her body and bringing into the world a reminder of her attacker. 
2. Sasha is single and on a low wage. Faced with a lack of affordable childcare, 
and other form of support for her lone parents she decides that she cannot 
have the child. 
3. Sophie is married and has three children. Due to the combined weight of their 
work and childcare commitments, she and her husband are highly stressed 
and rarely manage to spend “quality” time together. Sophie fears that, if she 
has another baby, it could destroy her marriage.”333 
Williams states that pro-choice advocates would have no problem with allowing the 
women to have an abortion in these three cases. Williams then goes on to discuss 
three more cases and contrasts them pairwise (e.g. comparing case 1 with 1, case 2 
with 2 etc): 
1. “Tamsin is told that any child she conceives will have a 25% chance of a 
mental impairment. Such a child would require round the clock care, would 
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never be independent and would manifest distressing behaviours such as 
compulsive self-mutilation. Tamsin believes that she could not cope with the 
emotional costs of having such a child but believes she could cope with 
having an unimpaired child. 
2. Anna is told that any child she conceives will have a 25% chance of having a 
physical impairment. Owing to the lack of support in her community for 
disabled people and their carers, she decides that she cannot afford to have 
such a child. However, she can afford to have a non-disabled child and wants 
to do so. 
3. Belinda and her husband are considering having their first baby which they 
believe they can afford, without compromising their relationship or their 
careers to which they are deeply committed. Belinda is told that there is a 
25% chance that any child of hers will have a serious disability. She fears that 
the additional strain which this outcome will place upon her and her husband 
could destroy their marriage.”334 
Williams argues that it would be wrong to allow the women in the first set of 
examples to have an abortion and not in the second set of examples if it is found out 
that the foetus will have a disability. In each pair of cases they are motivated to try 
and avoid the same bad outcome: serious emotional suffering (cases 1 and 1), 
increased vulnerability to poverty (cases 2 and 2), and increased risk of relationship 
breakdown, with all that entails materially and so on (cases 3 and 3).335 
Williams then continues to another set of scenarios involving sex-selective abortion. 
1. “Chen was sexually abused by her mother as a child and finds it difficult to 
this day to have relationships with other females. She becomes pregnant but 
comes to believe that she could not cope with the emotional costs involved in 
having a girl, including both the feeling of estrangement from the child and 
guilt if she were to give up her daughter for adoption. However, she wants a 
boy and feels capable of raising a boy. 
2.  Parminder and her husband live under cultural conditions in which girls are 
more costly to raise than boys. Females are largely discriminated against in 
the labour market, and so cannot contribute significantly to the family 
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economy. A daughter will continue to be a financial drain upon the family until 
a husband can be found for her. And even when a husband is found, the 
parents are expected to provide a substantial dowry for her. Parminder 
believes that she cannot afford to have a daughter but believes a son would 
be an asset and wants one. 
3. Susan is married and has four daughters. Her husband is becoming 
increasingly frustrated and unhappy living in an all-female household and 
desperately wants a boy to “balance” the family. Susan wants a boy and 
believes that a boy will strengthen her marriage. She becomes pregnant and 
believes that another girl would destroy her marriage.”336 
Once again Williams argues that if we contrast these cases pairwise with the 
previous set of cases we see that the women are trying to protect the same interests. 
He points out that if we believe that the individuals in the second set of cases provide 
a compelling case for abortion of a disabled foetus then it would be hard to deny that 
the individuals have an equally compelling case in the third set of cases for a sex 
selective abortion.337 
    Williams makes an excellent argument in defence of sex-selective abortion. He is 
correct in arguing that if we agree that an individual can have an abortion because of 
the financial or emotional strain involved in having a child which is disabled then why 
cannot the same reasoning be applied to sex-selective abortions? The parents can 
suffer the same financial and emotional burdens in both cases but yet most would 
instinctively agree that abortion because of disability is morally acceptable and 
abortion because of sex is morally unacceptable.  
    Sex-selective abortion is strengthened by the fact that there is nothing in the 
Abortion Act 1967 that states that abortion based upon sex is illegal. The only piece 
of legislation that refers to sex selection is the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Act 1990 which states embryos can be chosen for sex only where there is a risk that 
any resulting child will suffer from a gender-linked condition.338 As long as the doctor 
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is acting in “good faith” and believes that having a child of a certain sex would put a 
burden on a woman’s emotional and mental health, and taking into account a 
woman’s economic and social circumstances sex-selective abortion is legal. 
   Sex selection through abortion is something that we as a society may not be able 
to prevent. As long as a woman can prove to two medical practitioners that 
continuing with a pregnancy based upon the sex of the foetus will affect her mental 
well being then she should legally be granted one making sex-selective abortion 
technically legal within the UK. Based upon this reasoning, if sex-selective abortion 
is legal then why should sex selection through PGD for family balancing be banned? 
It seems unreasonable that a woman could obtain an abortion because of family 
balancing reasons but a woman could not use sex selection through PGD for the 
same reason. However, what is the difference between allowing sex selection to be 
legally performed through abortion but not through PGD? 
    John Harris points out that the destruction of embryos in IVF need no legal 
justification: 
 
     “The fallacy is that a decision to abort must ...be endorsed by two medical  
      practitioners and comply with the requirements of various Acts of parliament ...  
      On the other hand, a decision not to implant embryos requires no legal  
      justification whatsoever. The decision not to implant embryos in vitro is within the  
      unfettered discretion of any woman.”339   
 
Based upon this argument it should be within the woman’s discretion whether 
embryos should be implanted because of their sex. If a woman can obtain an 
abortion because of the sex of the foetus, should it not follow that women should be 
able to have access to PGD to select the sex of their children for family balancing 
reasons?  Would it not be more ethically and morally acceptable for sex selection for 
family balancing reasons to be performed through PGD instead of abortion because 
the embryo has not developed as much as would be the case with abortion. This 
argument is closely linked to the status of the embryo and will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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Status of Embryo 
    A strong opposition to sex selection is that it involves the possible creation and 
destruction of numerous embryos which brings into question what status do embryos 
have? This section will discuss the legal status of the embryo in English law and the 
effect it has on sex selection for non-medical reasons. Although, this section will be 
focused mainly on embryo research, the same principles can be applied to the legal 
status of embryos for sex selection. 
    There are those who believe that life begins at the moment of fertilization. For 
them PGD is not ethically preferable to abortion because both are forms of murder. It 
could be said that PGD is worse than prenatal diagnosis and abortion because PGD 
requires the creation and destruction of numerous embryos.340 This theory would 
hold that all sex selection whether for medical or non-medical reasons is wrong as 
embryos are human beings from the moment the egg is fertilized and consequently 
destroying any embryos would amount to murder. However, there are biological 
reasons to believe that humans start to exist at some point after the beginning of 
fertilization.341 Fertilization does not occur at a precise moment.342 “The process of 
conception is not completed until syngamy, when the chromosomes from the egg 
and the sperm have merged, sometime after the sperm has penetrated the egg”.343 
   The HFE Act does not follow the argument that life begins at fertilisation. Rather it 
takes a pragmatic approach which seems to balance all interests. On the one hand it 
allows PGD and research to take place on embryos but on the other hand it puts in 
place strict regulation for the treatment of embryos, during their creation, lifespan 
and possible destruction. It is argued that this solution is similar to the one that could 
be adopted in regard to sex selection for non-medical reasons. It takes into account 
both sides of the argument and comes to a reasonable solution which allows 
research to proceed but within strict regulation. The same could be done for sex 
selection for non-medical reasons in the UK. Sex selection for family balancing 
should be legal although within strict regulation. This will allow parents some 
reproductive freedom and choice over their children without going too far and 
treating them as mere commodities. If there is any chance, no matter how small, that 
                                                          
340
 Walker, M, ‘“Designer Babies” and Harm to Supernumerary Embryos’, 2008, American 
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 4, page 350. 
341
 Steinbeck, B, ‘The Morality of Killing Human Embryos’, 2006, 34 J.L. Med. & Ethics 26, page 27. 
342
 ibid.  
343
 ibid.  
92 
 
parents will have unreasonable expectations on their sex selected child, then they 
would be denied treatment. 
    The HFE Act accords embryos a “special status” and was influenced by 
recommendation 42 of the Warnock Committee Report, which was intimately linked 
to concerns about embryo research rather than concerns about assisted 
reproduction. The Committee stated that: 
 
     “...we are agreed that the embryo of human species ought to have a special  
      status and that no-one should undertake research on human embryos for the  
      purposes of which could be achieved by the use of other animals or in some  
      other way. The status of the embryo is a matter of fundamental principle which  
      should be enshrined in legislation.”344  
 
Not everyone on the Warnock Committee agreed with this. Their view was that 
embryos should be treated with a special status because of their potential to develop 
to a stage where everyone would agree that it would be accorded a status of a 
human person.345  
    Five years later when the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill was introduced 
into the Lords, the then Lord Chancellor (Lord Mackay of Clashfern) stated that a 
system of legal controls were necessary: 
 
      “...because of the need to show proper respect to the gametes and human  
       embryos, whether used for treatment, storage, or research. Whether or not an  
       embryo is to be treated as a child or a person, it clearly has the potential for  
       human life and should be treated with dignity such status deserves”.346  
 
It is clear that one of the main purposes of the HFE Act 1990 was to ensure that 
embryos were given the respect and dignity they deserve. Allowing sex selection for 
family balancing may mean that numerous embryos would be created and not all of 
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these embryos would be implanted into the women and thus would not have a 
chance of survival. However, whether embryos are implanted or surplus, they will be 
treated with the same respect and dignity that is given to embryos created through 
IVF or specifically for research purposes. 
    The HFE Act regulates the use of embryos and assisted reproduction strictly and 
one of the roles of the HFEA is to ensure that clinics are abiding by these rules. 
Firstly, a crucial provision of the HFE Act is that it allows a clinic to perform research 
upon an embryo up until the formation of the primitive streak. The primitive streak 
occurs 14 days after fertilization. Baroness Warnock, whose report formed the basis 
of the HFE Act stated that:  
 
    “before 14 days, the embryos, or pre-embryo as it was scientifically known, was a  
     loose cluster of first two, then four, then sixteen cells, undifferentiated. An  
     undifferentiated  cell could develop into any of the types of cell that go to make up  
     the human body, and some of them would not become part of the embryo at all,  
     but would form the placenta or the umbilical cord. After fourteen days, there  
     begins to appear the first traces of what will become the central nervous system  
     of the embryo, the primitive streak.”347  
 
The 14 day limit is essential the assisted reproduction because by 14 days it will be 
clear whether the embryo will split into two and thus forming twins or whether it will 
stay as a single embryo. It is at this stage that a person has been identified, in 
genetic terms at least.348 The 14 day limit is reflected in the HFE Act at section 3(3a) 
which states that no license can authorise the keeping or use of embryos after this 
time limit. Secondly, the HFE Act lays down absolute prohibitions for the use of 
embryos, for example, no embryo can be stored, used or researched upon without a 
license from the HFEA or can a human embryo be placed in an animal. Thirdly, the 
2008 amendments sets out the circumstances in which embryo testing may be 
authorised (para 1ZA(1) of Sch 2).349 This is not an absolute list of all the restrictions 
the HFE Act has in place in regard to embryos, it is just a few examples. It is argued 
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that by having these strict rules in place it assures the public that embryos are to be 
treated with the respect and dignity they deserve as well as allowing medical 
advances and parents to have healthy children free of disease.  Furthermore, the 
HFEA has issued the following guidance on the destruction of embryos:  
 
     “the centre should take account the special status of the human embryo when the  
      development of the embryo is to be brought to an end. Terminating the  
      development of embryos and disposing of the remaining material should be  
      approached with appropriate sensitivity having regard to the interests of the  
      gamete providers and anyone for whose treatment of the embryos were being  
      kept”.350  
 
This guidance implies that while it is legally possible to destroy spare or unwanted 
embryos, when doing so the embryo should be treated with respect and humanely 
destroyed. This should be done for those embryos which are created for sex 
selection purposes. Unfortunately, the destruction of embryos would be a 
consequence of sex selection for family balancing but if couples receive sex 
selective treatment in the UK at least it cans be ensured through strict regulation that 
the destruction of the embryos will be done humanely and with dignity. When 
couples travel abroad we do not know what sort of treatment they receive or how 
they treat discarded embryos.  
    These laws the HFE Act sets in place implies that while embryos can be used for 
human purposes they do have this special status which clinics and scientists need to 
respect. If embryos can be specifically351 created for the purposes of research with 
no intention of ever being implanted into a woman, why cannot embryos be created 
specifically for sex selection for family balancing? Embryos created for sex selection 
for family balancing would be treated in the exact same way as any other embryos 
created for medical reasons. They would be treated with dignity and respect and 
would be implanted into the woman before the 14 day limit which is when the first 
traces of a nervous system will appear. 
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    If the UK did allow sex selection for family balancing then there should be no 
disagreement from Europe over the status of the embryo. In the case of Vo v 
France352 the Grand Chamber held that, in the absence of any European consensus, 
considers that the States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation. This decision is 
central to the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life. The issue of when 
the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the court 
generally has on assisted reproduction because it means that although no protection 
of the foetus was not contrary to the convention, if another country decided to protect 
the foetus from the moment of conception it would not be contrary to the convention 
either. Also, the argument that the foetus and thus the embryo has no right to life 
under Article 2 of the convention is supported by the case of Evans where it was 
made clear by the domestic courts that under English Law an embryo does not have 
any independent rights or interests and cannot claim – or have claimed on its behalf 
– a right to life under Article 2. This is supported by the case of Boso v. Italy353. 
    Embryos do not have a right to life in the UK but they do have this “special” status. 
It is argued that creating embryos specifically for non-medical sex selection will not 
diminish this special status which they hold. It is proposed that clinics and scientists 
would continue to treat embryos with the respect and dignity that they are accorded 
under the HFE Act and the HFEA would continue to inspect clinics to ensure that 
they are abiding by the HFE Act. Regulating a contentious area such as the status of 
the embryo can be difficult as it is an area which cannot reflect the morals and 
values of everyone. It is an area with no definitive answer. No-one knows the exact 
point at which life begins. Despite this, the UK has adopted the middle ground and 
allows embryos to be researched upon and tested prior to implantation on the one 
hand but on the other it does not allow a too liberal approach by ensuring that the 
area is tightly regulated and controlled. Allowing sex selection for family balancing 
should not jeopardise this approach and does not bring into question a right to life. It 
is argued that the middle ground is allowing sex selection for family balancing 
because it allows parents to exercise their reproductive autonomy and to select the 
sex of their children in order to experience the rearing of both sexes within a tightly 
                                                          
352
 Vo v France, Application no. 53924/00, (ECtHR 8 July 2004). 
353
 Boso v Italy (no. 50490/99, decision of 05.09.2002). 
96 
 
regulated and controlled system which does not treat children as commodities and 
travel too far down the slope to designer babies. 
 
Conclusion 
    Currently, all non-medical sex selection is illegal within the UK. However, this 
chapter has shown that there are no legal obstacles in the way to sex selection 
becoming legal for family balancing. Article 8 of the ECHR protects the right to 
privacy which suggests that it would allow parents the freedom to select the sex of 
their children. However, Article 8 must be read in conjunction with article 8(2) which 
allows the state to legally interfere in citizens’ private lives in certain situations.  It is 
argued that the reasons in Article 8(2) are not a strong enough justification to ban 
sex selection for family balancing. Allowing sex selection for family balancing would 
be a proportionate response as it balances the reproductive rights of parents to 
select the sex of their children on the one hand while protecting society and the 
embryo on the other. Also, if a woman is able to obtain an abortion legally because 
of the sex of the foetus then should it not follow that sex selection for family 
balancing should become legal through PGD.  
    A main objection to sex selection for non-medical reasons is the welfare of the 
child requirement. Before couples can undergo reproductive treatment the clinic 
must be assured of the welfare of the child born as well as the welfare of any existing 
children. This includes the physical and psychological welfare. Allowing sex selection 
for family balancing may cause the selected child to suffer prejudicial treatment by its 
parents to fit parental expectations or an existing child may suffer from feelings of 
neglect because they are of the wrong sex. However, the HFEA has put in place 
strict guidelines and requirements to support clinics in protecting the welfare of any 
selected child. It is proposed that if the clinics have any suspicion that parents have 
ulterior motives to wanting a child of a certain sex the clinic would have the right to 
investigate further or to refuse treatment. There is no guarantee that clinics abroad 
will take into account the welfare of the future child or any existing child which may 
allow couples to have children of a certain sex because they have sexist and 
stereotypical views which may be forced upon their children.  Also, the HFEA has the 
ability to respond quickly to issues which are unforeseen through their code of 
practice and consequently while the welfare of the child is a fundamental 
requirement it is not a strong enough basis to ban sex selection for family balancing. 
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    If the HFEA is unsure of public opinion on sex selection for family balancing or that 
they feel that certain risks need to be further investigated before allowing sex 
selection for family balancing to become legal they could undertake a consultation. 
This consultation would need to be more in depth and researched more thoroughly 
so that accurate figures of how the country feels towards sex selection can be 
ascertained and that any consequences that may arise because of sex selection will 
not do so within the UK. However, it must be remembered that there should be a 
presumption of reproductive autonomy and that it is for those wishing to ban sex 
selection for family balancing to show that it will have an adverse affect upon society 
and not those wishing to use sex selective technology for family balancing. This 
dissertation has shown that while there are potential consequences and risks of 
allowing sex selection for family balancing to become legal within the UK, these are 
not strong enough to justify banning all non-medical sex selection and limiting 
reproductive autonomy.  
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Conclusion 
 
The advancement of PGD has allowed sex selection to be performed with amazing 
accuracy. While sex selection for medical reasons is legal within the UK, sex 
selection for non-medical reasons is not. This leaves parents who wish to choose the 
sex of their children for non-medical reasons with two options: to either travel abroad 
to a country which permits sex selection for non-medical reasons or to continue to 
‘try’ naturally. This dissertation has argued that sex selection for family balancing 
should become legal within the UK. 
     Most couples wishing to access sex selective technology in the UK do so for 
family balancing reasons354.  Various surveys have been conducted to determine 
how UK parents feel about the sex of their children. Results have shown that the 
majority of couples surveyed wish to have children of both sexes.355  However, 
should UK parents be given the freedom to choose the sex of their children? At one 
end of the scale there are those who believe that parents should be given unlimited 
reproductive freedom and at the other end of the scale there are those who believe 
that parents’ reproductive freedom should be totally limited. It is argued that a middle 
ground should be adopted – one that tries to take into account both ends of the 
scale. It is proposed that sex selection for family balancing should become legal 
within the UK but only if there were certain conditions put in place. Firstly, it is argued 
that parents should only be able to use sex selection for family balancing when they 
have children all of one sex, for example they have three boys and would like a girl. 
Parents should not be allowed to sex selection for family balancing when they have 
children of both sexes, although not in equal number, for example when they have 
three boys and one girl. Secondly, parents should not be allowed to select the sex of 
their child for the first, second or even third child.  This is because at two it could be 
said that an imbalance is beginning to form which may be rectified by a third child but 
by three it could be said that parents have been cheated by nature. Thirdly, it is 
argued that if sex selection for family balancing were to become legal then parents 
should pay for the treatment themselves. Sex selection for family balancing should 
not be provided by the NHS. This is because the NHS has limited resources and 
unfortunately cannot treat everyone. Sex selection for family balancing is not a 
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medical condition and consequently, it would seem unethical to divert resources 
away from those with medical needs and towards those who can have children but 
wish to have a child who is of a certain sex. Fourthly, it is argued that if sex selection 
for family balancing did become legal within the UK and parents did have to privately 
fund sex selective treatment then children from previous relationships should not be 
taken into account. 
    It is suggested that there is a strong belief among the UK public that permitting 
sex selection for family balancing would result in having an adverse effect upon 
society.356 These effects could be in the form of a distortion of the sex ratio, sex 
discrimination and stereotyping of boys and girls, a detrimental effect upon those 
who have gender dysphoria, treating children as commodities and the beginning of 
the slippery slope towards designer babies. This dissertation has argued that this 
would not be the case if sex selection for family balancing were to become legal 
within the UK. 
    Firstly, it is argued that sex selection for family balancing would not distort the ratio 
in favour of one sex as parents who want access to sex selective technology do so 
because they have children all of one sex and they would like a child of the opposite 
sex to ‘balance’ out their family. This is evidenced by the Gunns’ and the Trathens’ 
cases. They had children all of one sex and travelled abroad in order to use PGD to 
select the sex of their next child for family balancing reasons.357 It is argued by 
Savulescu that if you were concerned with the sex ratio then you would simply allow 
sex selection for family balancing. If this was to work then three conditions would 
need to be established. Firstly, that population sex differential is a bad thing. 
Secondly, that unfettered sex selection would allow the sex ratios to rise dramatically 
and thirdly, that family balancing alone would not cause population sex differentials 
to rise.  A distorted sex ratio would have a bad effect upon society. Literature has 
focused predominately on a more male dominated society which may lead to more 
violence and drunken aggression and push women may become more valued for 
their reproductive capacities. A potential consequence if unfettered sex selection 
were to become legal may mean that many men will be condemned to a life of 
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bachelorhood without a hope of finding love and companionship because of the 
scarcity of available women. It is thought that unfettered sex selection would not 
cause the sex ratio to rise as UK parents want children of both sexes. However, if 
there were concerns regarding unfettered sex selection causing sex ratios to rise 
then only sex selection for family balancing should become legal and certain 
requirements could be set in place, such as the pairing system, in order to prevent 
this.358  
    Secondly, it is argued that the UK is a multi-cultural society which values men and 
women equally and sex selection for family balancing would not prevent this. It is 
thought that it would not lead to sex discrimination and gender stereotyping. Some 
argue that parents who choose the sex of their child will expect that child to behave 
in a certain way which conforms to gender stereotyping. They will expect boys to like 
sports and fishing while girls will like pink and shopping. However, it is suggested 
that in the twenty-first century this is no longer the case and that there is the fear that 
permitting sex selection for family balancing in the UK will enhance discrimination 
and gender stereotypes rather than combating it. However, it is argued that this will 
not be the case as it is now recognised that there are biological differences between 
male and female children. These include different patterns of aggression, leaning, 
and spatial recognition as well as hormonal differences.359 Parents who want to 
choose the sex of their children do so for family balancing reasons and to experience 
the rearing of children of both sexes. Sex selection for family balancing is based 
upon the sex of existing children and not upon the assumption that one sex is 
superior to the other.  Further, there is a risk that any child born, whether naturally or 
through reproductive technology, may have gender dysphoria. It is suggested that 
children who have been selected because of their sex and who have gender 
dysphoria may feel more pressure to conform to more traditional gender roles in 
order to please their parents who have invested a great deal, financially, physically 
and emotionally, into having a child of a particular sex.360 Feelings of guilt may make 
them not be able to develop their own identity. However, it is argued that the risk that 
a sex selected child may be born with gender dysphoria is not a strong enough 
justification to limit parents’ reproductive autonomy and to ban sex selection for 
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family balancing within the UK. If parents do have sex discriminatory attitudes or will 
not love and support a child with gender dysphoria then they can be refused 
treatment based upon the welfare of the child requirement.361 This will be of a high 
standard and if the clinic feels that there is a risk to the potential future child or to any 
existing children, whether physically or psychologically, and no matter how small, 
parents will be prevented from choosing the sex of their children. 
    Thirdly, it could be argued that children could be treated as commodities and 
would not be loved unconditionally if sex selection for family balancing were to 
become legal within the UK. Children should not have to satisfy any requirements in 
order to merit the parents’ love. As Davis argues if we set conditions on which child 
we get, we are setting conditions on our love for whatever child we get. This implies 
that parents should not select against unhealthy embryos but this is not the case in 
the UK. Parents’ are permitted to select healthy embryos and for unhealthy embryos 
do be discarded which does not follow that parents should love their children 
unconditionally. Selection for sex may imply that those children may be prevented 
from having an open future, especially if they do not meet their parents’ gender 
stereotypical views, for example a girl may want to become a professional footballer 
instead of a ballet dancer or a boy may want to become a nurse instead of a builder. 
However, it is argued that children who are born naturally are sometimes subjected 
to high-pressure child-rearing practices which may prevent children from determining 
their own future but we do not prevent them.362  If we allow these high-pressured 
child-rearing practices, why should we not allow sex selection for family balancing? 
Experiments, such as the Jack-in-the-box experiment has shown that there are 
biological differences in boy and girl children, which could lead to the conclusion that 
parents should be allowed to select the sex of their children for family balancing 
reasons so that they experience the rearing of children of both sexes. It is suggested 
that children who are selected because of their sex can still determine their own 
future and have their own dreams. Parents are selecting which embryos to implant 
based upon sex, they are determining hair or eye colour, intelligence or sporting 
ability.  Kant’s second part of his categorical imperative implies that humans are 
valuable in themselves and should never be used only as a means to achieve 
something else, for example as mere commodities. Kant had no objection to using 
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people as a means but the difference is using humans merely as a means and using 
them as a means and at the same time as an end. This could imply that parents’ 
could select the sex of their children in order to achieve their own desire of raising a 
child of a certain sex as long as the future child is valued for themselves as well.  
    Fourthly, it is believed by some that permitting sex selection will be the beginning 
of the slippery slope towards designer babies.  However, it is argued that this is not 
the case either. Parents will only be able to choose which embryos are implanted 
based upon sex and that will be the extent of their choice. At the moment it is not 
possible to select children based upon hair or eye colour, sporting ability or level of 
intelligence but if it become possible to select for these characteristics in the future 
then parents should not have that choice. Allowing parents’ to select these 
characteristics may undermine our ability to succeed on our own merit. It is one thing 
to hit seventy home runs as a result of disciplined training and effort but it is 
something else to hit them as a result of genetically enhanced muscles. 
Achievements would no longer be down to natural ability but how much money 
parents invested in having a particular child.  Two classes of people may begin to 
form - the enhanced and the merely natural. This may lead to a widening of the gap 
between the wealthy and the poor as probably it will only be the wealthy that will be 
able to invest in selecting children with the best characteristics. Although, it is 
thought that parents will only be able to pass genes onto their children which they 
themselves carry. If they do not carry a gene for high sporting ability then they 
should not be able to select it in their children. It is argued that the embryo should 
not be altered to suit parents’ wishes and desires.363   
    While there are many detrimental consequences for society that could happen if 
unfettered sex selection did become legal in the UK, it is argued that this would not 
be the case if only sex selection for family balancing became legal and there were 
strict regulations put in place, such as parents have children all of one sex and would 
like a child of the opposite sex, they have at least three children all of one sex, that 
parents would have to pay for the treatment themselves and clinics could adopt the 
pairing system in order to maintain the sex ratio and that the welfare of the child was 
implemented to a high a standard. At the moment sex selection is only legal for 
medical reasons but it is argued that this should change to allow parents to select 
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the sex of their children for family balancing reasons.  Article 8(1) protects the right to 
a private family life must be read in conjunction with article 8(2) which allows that 
state to interfere when it is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.364 This 
allows the state to legally interfere in a person’s private life for certain reasons. It is 
argued that banning sex selection for family balancing is not necessary in the UK as 
it would not distort the sex ratio or enhance sex discrimination or be the beginning of 
the slippery slope towards designer babies. Further, any interference by the state 
must be proportionate. It is suggested that banning all non-medical sex selection is 
not a proportionate response. Allowing sex selection for family balancing would be a 
proportionate response as it allows parents some control over the sex of their 
children without distorting the sex ratio and enhancing sex discrimination. It also 
attempts to balance all the competing interests involved in the sex selection debate, 
including the welfare of the future child as if parents’ have unusual motivations for 
wanting a child of certain sex then they would be refused treatment. Furthermore, it 
is argued that if a woman could obtain an abortion based upon the sex of the foetus 
then why should parents’ be prevented from selecting the sex of their child through 
PGD or sperm sorting techniques? If a women could prove to two medical 
practitioners that having a child of a certain sex would affect her mental well-being 
then she could legally be granted an abortion. If this is the case, then could it not 
follow that sex selection performed through PGD or sperm sorting for family 
balancing reasons could become legal.   
    I conclude that sex selection for family balancing should become legal within the 
UK. This is because research has revealed that it would not have a detrimental effect 
upon society and that it is a proportionate response which balances the parents’ right 
to reproductive freedom, the public’s interest and the interest of the future embryo. I 
would recommend that strict rules and regulations should be set in place to ensure 
that sex selection for family balancing is performed legitimately and ethically.  
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